Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ by Margolis, Emanuel
Volume 98 
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 98, 
1993-1994 
6-1-1994 
Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ 
Emanuel Margolis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Emanuel Margolis, Habeas Corpus: The No-Longer Great Writ, 98 DICK. L. REV. 557 (1994). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol98/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Habeas Corpus:
The No-Longer Great Writ
Emanuel Margolis*
I. Introduction . ............................. 558
II. A Brief Look Backwards ..................... 563
II. Habeas Corpus in Decline .................... 567
IV. Habeas Corpus: Some Bright Spots ............. 579
V. "Finality," "Federalism," and "Scarce Judicial Resources":
Rationale or Pretext? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  583
A. Finality .............................. 585
B. Federalism ............................. 588
C. Scarcity of Resources .................... 593
VI. The Capital Punishment Nexus ................. 599
VII. Reform Through Review: The Case for Strict Scrutiny 609
VIII. Actual Innocence: "Escape Hatch" or "Death Trap"? . 617
IX . Conclusion ............................... 622
Appendix A ...................................... 627
Mr. Margolis is a partner with the Stamford, Connecticut law firm of Wofsey, Rosen,
Kweskin & Kuriansky, where his practice focuses on criminal and constitutional law. He also
serves as Chair of the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union and as an Adjunct Professor of
Advanced Constitutional Law at Quinnipiac College School of Law.
The author would like to thank Estelle T. Margolis, Professor Martin Margulies, and
Judith Rosenberg for their assistance in preparing this article.
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1994
I. Introduction
In May 1913, Leo M. Frank, a Jewish manufacturer in Atlanta,
Georgia, was charged with the rape-murder of a Christian employee
named Mary Phagan.' The facts surrounding his trial leave no doubt
that an anti-Semitic mob created an extremely volatile climate
surrounding the courtroom, including a clear potential for violence. The
threats of violence were so real that the judge ordered both Mr. Frank
and his attorney to be absent from the courtroom during part of the trial
to avoid the "probable danger of violence."2 Mr. Frank was convicted
on August 25, 1913 and sentenced to death the following day.3
A majority of the United States Supreme Court denied Frank the
habeas relief he sought on collateral appeal after his direct appellate
efforts failed.4 The majority opinion, noting that the petitioner's "mob
domination" claim had been rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court,5
concluded that the Georgia courts "upon a full review" had decided that
Frank's allegations were unfounded.6 Therefore, Frank's constitutional
claim could not be relitigated by way of habeas corpus regardless of the
claim's merit. Within a few months of the Supreme Court's decision,
a lynch mob seized Frank from jail and hanged him. Sixty-seven years
later, Frank was found innocent of the crime.7
In Arkansas, on September 30, 1919, a group of gun-toting white
men attacked and shot at blacks meeting in their church.' One of the
white men was shot and killed in the disturbance which followed. Five
black men were charged, convicted, and sentenced to death.9 As in the
I. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 311 (1915).
2. Id. at 315. The mob-dominated atmosphere which prevailed at the time of Frank's
trial caused an eyewitness to the murder to refuse to come forward to testify to Frank's
innocence. This same witness later identified another man as the murderer.
3. Id. at 312.
4. Id. at 344. This "full review" would later become a talismanic standard for denying
federal habeas review in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) and its progeny. See infra
notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
5. See Frank v. State, 80 S.E. 1016 (Ga. 1914).
6. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. at 335. In his dissent, Justice Holmes refers to "lynch
law .. .practiced by a regularly drawn jury," and insists upon the federal courts' "power to
-secure fundamental rights" through habeas corpus, which power "becomes a duty" once "resort
to the local tribunal ... has been had in vain." Id. at 348-50 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7. See Wendell Rawls, Jr., After 69 Years of Silence, Lynching Victim is Cleared, N.Y.
TIMES, March 8, 1982, at A12. Leo Frank was issued an unconditional posthumous pardon by
the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles in 1986. Georgia Pardons Victim 70 Years After
Lynching, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1986, at A16.
8. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923).
9. Shortly after the defendants' arrest, a lynch mob marched on the jail where they were
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Frank case, the defendants claimed that a mob atmosphere prevailed
during both the grand jury and petit jury proceedings.' The
defendants sought habeas relief in the federal courts after state appeals
failed.
Justice Holmes wrote the Supreme Court decision this time, and
the "full review" language that had sent an innocent Leo Frank to his
death was given much more exacting scrutiny. The Court preceded its
analysis by stressing the following:
(1) Blacks having been systematically excluded, the
defendants' trial before an all-white jury was expedited;
(2) A court-appointed lawyer was appointed to represent all
five defendants;
(3) Counsel had no preliminary consultation with his clients
and called no witnesses in their defense even though such
witnesses were available;
(4) The entire trial consumed about forty-five minutes, and
the jury rendered a verdict of guilty of first-degree
murder in less than five minutes. "
Justice Holmes concluded from these and related facts in the record
before the Court that "there never was a chance for the petitioners to be
acquitted; no juryman could have voted for an acquittal and continued
to live in Phillips County and if any prisoner by any chance had been
acquitted by a jury he could not have escaped the mob."'
12
But how was the Court to deal with the procedural "fact" that the
"Moore Five" had been granted "full review" in the Arkansas state
courts? The majority opinion of the Court declared that where, as here,
"the whole proceeding is a mask ... neither perfection in the
machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial court and
counsel saw no other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the
mob can prevent this Court from securing to the petitioners their
constitutional rights."'3  Perhaps the most succinct capsule of the
being held and were prevented from lynching the prisoners only by the presence of federal
troops and the "promise" by a number of "leading officials" of the State that "if the mob
would refrain .. .they would execute those found guilty in the form of law." Id. (quoting
from petitioners' supporting affidavits). The Arkansas officials made good on their "promise"
by calling several "colored witnesses and having them whipped and tortured until they would
say what was wanted .... Id. at 89.
10. Id.
II. Id. at 89.
12. Id. at 89-90.
13. Id. at 91.
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principle laid down in Moore was this comment by Justice Black thirty
years later: "Moore v. Dempsey ... stand[s] for the principle that it is
never too late for courts in habeas corpus proceedings to look straight
through procedural screens in order to prevent forfeiture of life or
liberty in flagrant defiance of the Constitution."'
' 4
Within seventy years of Moore and eighty years of Frank we have
witnessed a reversion to the "logic" in Frank that is breathtaking both
in its scope and its speed. The Nixon, Reagan, and Bush 5 appointees
to the Supreme Court have eviscerated the essence of the Great Writ,
culminating in the Court's decision in Herrera v. Collins.6
Leonel Herrera was convicted of capital murder by a Texas jury in
January 1982 and sentenced to death. His arrest and trial grew out of
the shooting homicide of a police officer in September 1981."' The
officer, who survived the shooting for nine days, identified Herrera as
his assailant, as did the officer's civilian passenger. On appeal, Herrera
challenged these identifications as unreliable and improperly
admitted.'"
Herrera unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on direct
appeal'9 and in two collateral proceedings.2" He also filed a federal
habeas corpus petition which was denied.2' A second habeas petition
was filed in the state court, this time based on newly discovered
evidence tending to prove Herrera's "actual innocence." Not unlike the
infamous Frank case, in which innocence rather than procedural
irregularity or a constitutional violation was at issue, Herrera sought to
obtain habeas relief so that his case might be reopened for the
introduction of new exculpatory evidence. The evidence in question
had not surfaced until 1984, several years after Herrera's trial and
14. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 554 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).
15. In 1991, after repeated efforts by the Reagan and Bush Administrations to restore the
status quo ante of Moore v. Dempsey, the Senate passed a "Crime Bill" by a vote of 58-42,
barring federal habeas corpus review of constitutional violations if the issue "has been fully
and fairly adjudicated in State proceedings." VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL ACT, S. REP. No.
1241, 102d CONG., IST SESS. 9999 (1991). Fortunately, the House version of this bill (H.R.
3371) went down to defeat.
16. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
17. The facts of the case are set forth in detail in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Id.
at 856-58.
18. Id. at 857-58.
19. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313
(1984).
20. Ex parte Herrera, No. 12, 848-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 2, 1985).
21. Again, Herrera challenged the reliability and admissibility of the highly incriminating
identification evidence against him. Herrera v. Collins, 904 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 925 (1990).
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conviction. In that year, a former cellmate of Herrera's brother, Raul,
and an attorney who had represented Raul, executed affidavits attesting
to the fact that Raul, who had recently died, had told them both that he,
and not Leonel, had committed the murder.22
Herrera's second federal habeas petition protested his innocence,
proffered additional supporting affidavits, and claimed that his execution
would thus violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district
court, while dismissing most of petitioner's claims as an "abuse of the
writ,"" nonetheless granted his request for a stay of execution "out of
a sense of fairness and due process."24 The Court of Appeals vacated
the stay,25 holding that petitioner's claim of "actual innocence" was
not cognizable in habeas corpus because "the existence merely of newly
discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a
ground for relief on federal habeas corpus." '26 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed, and Herrera was executed on May 12, 1993.
Speaking for a 5-1-3 majority,27 Chief Justice Rehnquist, stressing
the fact that habeas corpus performs a different function than a direct
appeal, declared that the facts establishing guilt or innocence cannot be
reviewed in collateral proceedings.S While assuming "for the sake of
argument" that a "truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence'
made after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional," warranting habeas relief, the Rehnquist majority
opinion set the threshold showing "extraordinarily high" and found that
Herrera fell short.29
22. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 858. The attorney's affidavit states that while he was
representing Raul Herrera on a charge of attempted murder, Raul told him that he, Leonel, their
father, and several officers were involved in drug trafficking. Id. at 858 n.2. Raul insisted that
he, not his brother, had shot the officer for which Leonel stood convicted as a capital murderer.
Id. Raul had said nothing about his role in the murder because he assumed his brother would
be acquitted. Id. Other affidavits attesting to petitioner's innocence and his brother Raul's
guilt were filed by Raul's cellmate, Raul's son, and a schoolmate of the Herrera brothers. Id.
at 858.
23. Id. at 859 (citing the case as No. M-92-30 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 1992)).
24. Id. Petitioner raised a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), alleging
that both the State's withholding of exculpatory information and Texas's 60-day limit for filing
a claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence constituted violations of due
process. These assertions were rejected out of hand in the federal habeas proceedings as well
as by the Supreme Court. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 865-66.
25. Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992).
26. Id. at 1034 (emphasis added) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)).
27. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at
875.
28. Id. at 859-60.
29. Id. at 869. In habeas proceedings, the Chief Justice argued, the linch-pin is
procedural due process rather than substantive due process. Id. "Federal habeas review of
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that "[n]othing
could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency or more
shocking to the conscience than to execute a person who is actually
innocent."3 He had to remind his colleagues that the execution of an
innocent person "epitomizes 'the purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering. '
A complete chronicle of developments in habeas corpus law
covering the past seven decades will not be attempted within the
confines of this article. However, in order to comprehend the
metamorphosis of what is probably the most precious of all our
constitutional liberties into its present, nearly emasculated form, a
decisional "rear-view mirror" is essential. How else can we understand
how we got from there to here?32 How else can we explain a decision
such as Herrera in which, paraphrasing one of its present occupants, the
Supreme Court majority may well have engaged in an act of "high-tech
lynching"?
The analysis which follows leads directly to the following
conclusions:
(1) That the law of habeas corpus and of capital punishment
are inextricably intertwined; it is impossible to
comprehend and evaluate habeas jurisprudence without
parallel examination of capital punishment law.
(2) That the Constitutional guarantees of habeas corpus and
the fundamental rights of life and liberty can only be
protected under a system of judicial review which is
strict in capital cases and, at a minimum, intermediate in
non-capital cases.
state convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring
in the course of the underlying state criminal proceedings. Our federal habeas cases have
treated claims of 'actual innocence,' not as an independent constitutional claim, but as a basis
upon which a habeas petitioner may have an independent constitutional claim considered on
the merits, even though his habeas petition would otherwise be regarded as successive or
abusive." Id.
30. Id. at 876 (citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 877 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). As to the
significance of the "actual innocence" claim in habeas proceedings, as distinguished from
"legal innocence," see Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518-20 (1992); McCleskey v.
Zant, Ill S. Ct. 1454, 1474 (1991); and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
32. While this article was in the course of preparation, several major legislative proposals
were being put forward in the name of habeas corpus reform. See, e.g., the "Habeas Corpus
Reform Act of 1993" introduced by Senator Joseph Biden on August 6, 1993. S. 1441, 103d
CONG., IST SESS. § 2 (1993) [hereinafter the Biden Bill].
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(3) That the growing emphasis by the Supreme Court on
"actual innocence" and "innocence of death" in recent
habeas law is not an "escape hatch" for death-row
prisoners, but a trap for the unwary and a "Catch 22" for
the wary.
II. A Brief Look Backwards
The writ of habeas corpus is traceable to the common law, well
before the founding of this nation. The framers of the Constitution took
it for granted33 that federal courts were authorized to issue the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjiciendum.3 4 Indeed, the "Great Writ" has been
aptly termed "the greatest of the safeguards of personal liberty
embodied in the common law . .. "'
Under Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public
Safety may require it." This provision mirrors the commitment of the
Framers to individual rights, as well as an ancient principle of Anglo-
American law dating back to the Magna Carta.3 6
The Judiciary Act of 1789 included a grant of federal jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus according to the "usages and principles
33. This assumption was based on the powers extended to Congress by the "necessary
and proper" clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, the "inferior Courts" clause, U.S. CONST., art. III,
§ 1, and the appellate jurisdiction clause, U.S. CONST., art. Ill, § 2. Felix Frankfurter & James
M. Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal
Courts -A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010, 10 16-23 (1924).
34. According to former Chief Justice Marshall, the phrase "habeas corpus" is actually a
kind of shorthand for the common law writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, known as the
"Great Writ." Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). Blackstone has uncovered
four other forms of habeas corpus in addition to its function as a remedy for illegal detention,
namely: habeas corpus ad respondandum; ad satisfaciendum; ad prosequendum, testificandum
et deliberandum; and adfaciendum et recipiendum. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 n.5
(1963) (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129-32).
35. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 312 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953).
Rooted in the English common law, habeas corpus "is perhaps the most important writ known
to the constitutional law of England, affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all
cases of illegal restraint or confinement. It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use
occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward 1." Secretary of State for Home Affairs v.
O'Brien, 1923 App. Cas. 603, 609 (appeal taken from Ir.), quoted in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at
400.
36. "No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of his
peers and by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA para. 39 (quoted in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY 4 (Melvin 1. Urofsky ed. 1989)).
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of law."37  While the writ originally extended only to federally-held
prisoners,38 it was extended to state prisoners by Act of Congress on
February 5, 1867."9 The statute required that the court inquire into the
facts and "dispose of the party as law and justice require."4  Since
both the. 1789 and the 1867 statutes merely authorized the federal courts
to issue writs of habeas corpus, the writ's scope was, in accordance
with common law, limited to examination of the jurisdiction of the
sentencing tribunal.4 '
The scope of the writ was expanded as the Court stretched the
meaning of the term "jurisdiction." As Justice Powell points out in
Stone v. Powell,42 one of the main reasons for this expansion was the
fact that, for all practical purposes, there was no appellate review in
federal criminal cases prior to 1889. Therefore, pressure built up for
expansion of the scope of habeas corpus "to reach otherwise
unreviewable decisions involving fundamental rights."'3
It is arguable that the expansive language of the 1867 statute,
which extended the writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners "restrained
of [their] liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or
law ... ,," opened the door to an expansive application of the writ to
persons convicted after trial. Thus, in Ex parte Lange, 5 the Court
held that the constitutionality of a statute could be reviewed on habeas
on the theory that an unconstitutional deprivation meant that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction. Other cases subsequent to Lange expanded
the want-of-jurisdiction rationale."
The modem contours of the writ began to emerge with the Court's
decision in Frank v. Mangum.47 Although Frank's contentions were
considered and rejected by the federal district court as well as by the
37. Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789).
38. Id.
39. Ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (current version now incorporated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241
el seq. (West 1994)) [hereinafter Habeas Corpus Act of 1867]. The statute authorized federal
courts to grant relief in all cases "where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States ..... Id.
40. Id.
41. See Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); Ex
parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
42. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
43. Id. at 475 n.7. See, e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1880); FELIX
FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 109-27 (1928).
44. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, supra note 39.
45. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
46. See, e.g., In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887); Ex
parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
47. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court, the latter noted by way of dictum that if the state
appellate courts failed to provide adequate "corrective process" for full
consideration of any denial of the prisoner's rights, whether or not
"jurisdictional," the court could properly examine the merits to
determine if a detention is lawful.4 As already noted, the minority
view expressed in Holmes's dissenting opinion later became the
prevailing view of the Court in Moore v. Dempsey.49
With its landmark decision in Brown v. Allen,5" the Supreme
Court ushered in the modem era of habeas corpus. In Brown, the
petitioner argued that his indictment should have been quashed on the
grounds that grand jurors had been discriminatorily selected and that
certain confessions had been improperly admitted into evidence. While
the state supreme court had fully adjudicated these issues on appeal,5
the United States Supreme Court nevertheless held that: (1) Brown was
entitled to a full reconsideration of his constitutional claims on federal
habeas corpus, even though those claims had been fully and fairly
adjudicated at the state court level; and (2) the federal district court's
redetermination should consider issues both of law and fact.52
Fay v. Noia,53 decided in 1963, represents the high-water mark of
federal habeas corpus relief. In this coerced confession case, the federal
trial court held that Noia's failure to appeal barred federal habeas
review.54 The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court
upheld the issuance of the writ, holding that federal courts should
consider constitutional claims on habeas corpus review, even if the
48. Id. at 333-36.
49. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
50. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Brown was clearly foreshadowed by Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923). In the view of one authoritative commentary, "Moore marked the
abandonment of the Supreme Court's deference, founded upon considerations of comity, to
decisions of state appellate tribunals on issues of constitutionality and the proclamation of its
intention no longer to treat as virtually conclusive pronouncements by the latter that
proceedings in a trial court were fair..." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, THE CONS'ITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1454
(Lester S. Jayson et al. eds., 1972). This should be contrasted with the current Court's
reassertion of such "deference" under the guise of the "federalism" doctrine. See discussion
infra part V.B.
51. State v. Brown, 63 S.E.2d 99 (N.C.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 943 (1951).
52. Brown, 344 U.S. at 466-76. See also the companion case of Daniels v. Allen, 344
U.S. 458, 486 (1953), where a similar petition was rejected because the papers were not timely
filed, and the Court refused to grant habeas relief by overriding the state's "legitimate"
procedural rules.
53. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
54. Id. at 396. This decision was in line with the rule laid down in Sunal v. Large, 332
U.S. 174 (1947), that habeas corpus and its statutory counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982),
"will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." Sunal, 322 U.S. at 178.
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petitioner failed to raise them by way of state appellate procedures, if
at the time the constitutional issue was raised in the federal court the
petitioner could no longer raise it in the state courts.5 5 Since Noia had
not deliberately bypassed state appellate relief, he was not precluded
from securing federal habeas relief. With its decision in Fay v. Noia,
the Court appeared to have removed the final barrier to broad collateral
review of state criminal convictions by establishing the "deliberate
bypass" test for the cognizability of claims on which petitioners
procedurally defaulted in state proceedings.56
The Supreme Court's trend toward expanding habeas corpus relief
continued six years later with the decision in Kaufman v. United
States,57 overruling a majority of the federal courts of appeal 8 and
holding that search and seizure claims were cognizable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.59 In Kaufman, the Court noted that federal habeas "extends
to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was
admitted against them at trial." 0  Therefore, under § 2255, it made
little or no sense to restrict "access by federal prisoners with illegal
search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies, while placing
no similar restriction on access by state prisoners."
6'
The tide continued to flow toward widening the scope and
application of habeas corpus until 1976. In that year, the Court decided
Stone v. Powell.62 Suddenly, the tide began to ebb and the "Great
Writ" began to appear as something less than "great."
55. Fay, 372 U.S. at 398-99.
56. Id. at 438-39. Having been convicted of murder in the New York courts, Noia failed
to appeal his conviction. Id. at 394-95. Later, he sought relief from his conviction by
pursuing a state remedy of coram vobis, but relief was denied on the grounds that his failure to
pursue a direct state appeal precluded collateral inquiry into the voluntariness of his confession.
Id. at 396 n.3. The deliberate bypass principle was a significant element in his ultimate
success by way of federal habeas corpus proceedings. The Court found that Noia had not
deliberately bypassed state appellate relief. Id. at 439-40. If Noia had been guilty of deliberate
bypass, this would have afforded an adequate state ground sufficient to foreclose relief.
57. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Re, 372 F.2d 641 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912
(1967); Thornton v. United States, 368 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Eisner v. United States, 351
F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1965).
59. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982), federal prisoners seek post-conviction relief by
means of a motion to vacate judgment. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), held
that the federal statute and habeas corpus were equivalent. Claims cognizable under one are
cognizable under the other. Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 217. Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)
(claims brought by state prisoners by way of an application for a writ of habeas corpus)
represents a statutory analogue to the constitutional provision for the "Great Writ."
60. Kaufman, 394 U.S. at 225.
61. Id. at 226 (emphasis added).
62. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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III. Habeas Corpus in Decline
In his dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell, Justice Brennan
predicted that the Court's holding in that case "portend[ed] substantial
evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction . . . ."' His dire
forecast proved prophetic. Floyd Powell and David Rice, who were
state prisoners in California and Nebraska respectively, had sought and
obtained a writ of habeas corpus at the court of appeals level. Relief
was granted on the ground that evidence obtained through an
* unconstitutional search and seizure was wrongfully admitted at their
trial.' Applying a cost/benefit analysis to the respondents'
contentions, Justice Powell, writing for a 6-3 majority, ruled that the
state courts had provided an opportunity for the full and fair litigation
of the prisoners' Fourth Amendment claims, thus precluding habeas
relief to re-litigate the issue.65
Aside from the fact that Stone v. Powell was a clear harbinger of
the gradual erosion of the exclusionary rule during the late 1970s and
throughout the decade of the 1980s, this milestone case represented a
storm warning for future habeas petitioners. The specific question
presented was "whether state prisoners - who have been afforded the
opportunity for full and fair consideration of their reliance upon the
exclusionary rule with respect to seized evidence by the state courts at
trial and on direct review - may invoke their claim again on federal
habeas corpus review. 66  Weighing the "benefit" of the exclusionary
rule against the "costs" of extending it to habeas review of search-and-
seizure claims, Justice Powell answered the question in the negative.
6
Perhaps the most insidious element in the majority opinion in Stone
v. Powell is its emphasis on the concept - nowhere supported in the
Constitution or the English common law - that resort to habeas corpus
should be limited primarily to protect the innocent. The Court said that
the purpose and focus of a criminal trial and the "central concern in a
criminal proceeding" is "the ultimate question of guilt or
63. Id. at 503.
64. Id. at 471, 473-74.
65. Id. at 489-96.
66. Id. at 489.
67. Id. at 489-96. This same "balance-sheet" approach to the Fourth Amendment,
weighing "costs" against "benefits," reached its apex of constitutional evisceration eight years
later in the "good-faith" case of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon, the
Court held that any rule such as the exclusionary rule "bear[s] a heavy burden of justification
and must be carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by deterring
official lawlessness." Id. at 908 n.6 (emphasis added) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
257-58 (1983) (White, J., concurring)).
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innocence...," Furthermore, Justice Powell declared that the
physical evidence that the defendant sought to suppress and exclude
"[was] typically reliable and often the most probative information
bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." '9
In its haste to convict the "guilty," the majority in Stone
undermined a major cornerstone of habeas corpus doctrine. It should
be noted that the majority did not take issue with the fact that the
habeas petitioners were convicted on the basis of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence which was nevertheless admitted against them at trial.
Thus, the Justices agreed that the defendants were deprived of their
Fourth Amendment rights. However, this constitutional right
vanishes70 under Stone v. Powell once the state appellate process is
exhausted, so long as this process is "full and fair." In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Brennan noted that instead of honoring the
constitutional command that the federal courts should be the final
arbiters of enforcement of federal constitutional principles, "[t]he
Court . . . simply ignores the settled principle that for purposes of
adjudicating constitutional claims Congress, which has the power to do
so under Art[icle] III of the Constitution, has effectively cast the district
courts sitting in habeas in the role of surrogate Supreme Courts."'"
In the wake of Stone, habeas corpus was soon to become a matter
of judicial discretion rather than constitutional imperative. Some
constitutional violations might sufficiently impugn the integrity of the
judicial process; others might not. The cost/benefit approach taken by
the Court's majority signaled a pinched view of habeas corpus whereby,
to paraphrase George Orwell, some constitutional rights are more equal
than others.
The Court's 1977 decision in Wainwright v. Sykes72 signaled a
full retreat from the "deliberate bypass" test laid down in Fay v.
68. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490.
69. Id. "Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the
guilty." Id. (emphasis added). Chief Justice Burger, concurring, decried the rejection of
"trustworthy evidence of guilt, at the expense of setting obviously guilty criminals free to ply
their trade." Id. at 500. But see discussion infra part VIII.
70. "Today's opinion itself starkly exposes the illogic of the Court's seeming premise that
the rights recognized in Mapp somehow suddenly evaporate after all direct appeals are
exhausted." Stone, 428 U.S. at 512-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Stone majority reasoned
that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was designed to deter future police violation of
Fourth Amendment rights, and that its application in federal habeas proceedings many years
after the fact would, at best, provide only marginal deterrence. Id. at 493-94.
71. Id. at 511-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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Noia." Sykes was a state prisoner who claimed that he had not
validly waived his Miranda rights as to certain inculpatory statements
introduced at his trial. This claim was not made at trial as required by
a state contemporaneous objection rule, nor was suppression sought by
way of a pre-trial motion. The Supreme Court held that the deliberate
bypass rule was inapplicable here because the contemporaneous
objection rule merited "greater respect." 4 In the view of the Burger
Court majority, the Fay v. Noia deliberate bypass test tends to
"encourage 'sandbagging' on the part of defense lawyers, who may take
their chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court with the
intent to raise their constitutional claims in federal habeas court if their
initial gamble does not pay off."" In rejecting Sykes's federal
collateral appeal, the Court sharply reduced the reach of Fay v. Noia,
effectively barring habeas relief unless the state prisoner could
demonstrate both "cause" for his failure to assert a claim and "actual
prejudice" resulting directly from the alleged constitutional
deprivation.76
Within three years of Stone v. Powell, and two years following
Sykes, the Court held that an error of law did not provide a basis for
habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unless it constituted "a
fundamental deficit which inherently results in a complete miscarriage
of justice."7 7  That same year, the Court restricted habeas relief only
to those cases in which there were "extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems."7"
73. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963). Actually, Sykes did not even attempt to meet his
deliberate-bypass burden under Fay (see Sykes, 433 U.S. at 99 (White, J., concurring)), and
three concurring Justices did not consider Sykes to be inconsistent with Fay. Id. at 91, 94, 97-
98 (Burger, J., White, J., and Stevens, J., concurring).
74. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87-91.
75. Id. at 89.
76. Id. at 87. The "cause and prejudice" rule in Sykes was foreshadowed by the Court's
earlier decision in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). Davis was afederal prisoner
who had defaulted an identical federal claim under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure at the trial court level. Id. at 234-36. The Supreme Court held that, on
collateral review, the federal habeas court was barred from hearing Davis' claim unless he
could show "cause" for his failure to challenge the composition of the grand jury before trial,
as well as "actual prejudice" as a result of this unconstitutional grand jury selection. Id. at
242-45. See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (a very similar case
involving a grand jury challenge, with a similar denial of habeas relief grounded on "cause and
prejudice").
77. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) (quoting Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
78. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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In 1982, the Court proceeded to define the Sykes "cause" and
"prejudice" standards more precisely, having declined to define those
terms in Sykes itself. In two decisions handed down simultaneously in
its 1982-83 term, the Court held that jury instructions to which there
was no objection at trial could not furnish the basis for federal habeas
relief. In Engle v. Isaac,79 the jury was instructed that the burden of
proof on the issue of self-defense was to be placed on the capital
defendant rather than on the state, contrary to the principle laid down
in Mullaney v. Wilbur.80  In United States v. Frady,8  a federal
prisoner convicted of first-degree murder sought to overturn his
conviction on the ground that the trial jury instructions on the issue of
malice - given without defense objection - blurred the distinction
between manslaughter and second-degree murder.
Applying the "cause" and "actual prejudice" standards of Sykes, the
Supreme Court in Engle found the absence of the "cause" prong to be
fatal.82 The petitioner's contention that his failure to object to the trial
court's jury instructions on the self-defense burden of proof occurred
several months before Mullaney was decided was found to be
unpersuasive. After all, the Court reasoned, the tools for the assertion
of Mullaney claims were known and available to defense practitioners
before that case was decided - hence, there was no valid "cause" for
the failure to object."3
In the Frady case, the Court upheld the denial of habeas relief
because the petitioner failed to show "actual prejudice."84  A mere
possibility of prejudice to the defendant was insufficient; rather, the
instructional error had to work "to his actual and substantial
disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions."85  At this point, the Stone-Sykes burden on the habeas
petitioner began to approach Sisyphus-like proportions. The Court
79. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
80. 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975). Mullaney v. Wilbur actually involved a heat-of-passion
defense which, under Maine law, required the defendant to bear the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence.
81. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
82. Engle, 456 U.S. at 130-34.
83. Id. at 133. "Cause" has been narrowly construed ever since its "definition" in Engle,
the only exception to the exception being the case where barring habeas review would result in
a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. at 135.
84. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170-72.
85. 456 U.S. at 170 (emphasis in original). "Federal intrusions into state criminal trials
frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to
honor constitutional rights." Engle, 456 U.S. at 128.
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recognized this when it declared in Barefoot v. Estelle86 that "[t]he role
of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that
constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited. Federal
courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials."87
Out of a professed concern for finality, federalism, and
conservation of judicial resources, the Court issued an unholy trinity of
habeas decisions in 1986, shifting its focus away from constitutional
deprivations and toward fact-based inquiries into the petitioner's guilt
or innocence. In Kuhlmann v. Wilson,88 the Court held in a plurality
opinion that the "miscarriage of justice" exception to the "cause and
prejudice" requirement would allow for successive claims to be heard
only if the petitioner "establish[es] that under the probative evidence he
has a colorable claim of factual innocence." 89  The standard for
determination of factual innocence was expressed in these terms:
[T]he prisoner must "show a fair probability that, in light of all the
evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but
with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably
claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available
only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a
reasonable doubt of his guilt."'
In Murray v. Carrier,9' actual innocence was declared to be an
exception to the preclusionary rule in habeas cases normally applicable
to procedurally defaulted claims. In Carrier, the Court held that in
cases where "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the
86. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
87. Id. at 887. Barefoot was executed on October 30, 1984.
88. 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
89. Id. at 454.
90. Id. at 455 n.17 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack
on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160 (1970)). Conveniently omitted by the
plurality opinion is Judge Friendly's emphasis on the principle that there are many situations
where, irrespective of the issue of "reasonable doubt," constitutional violations undermine the
"fundamental fairness" of the criminal process itself. Friendly, supra, at 151-54. This is
quintessentially true in capital sentencing cases because the death penalty is qualitatively and
morally different from any other form of criminal punishment. "It is of vital importance to the
defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear
to be, the consequence of scrupulously fair procedures." Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545-
46 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
91. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
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procedural default." '92  Denial of habeas review under such
circumstances would create a "fundamental miscarriage of justice. 93
The third of this trio of 1986 decisions was Smith v. Murray.94
There, in the context of capital sentencing, the Court failed to find any
"miscarriage of justice" in the failure of the lower court to examine the
merits95 of the petitioner's procedurally defaulted claims. Smith's
inculpatory statements, in clear violation of his Fifth Amendment rights,
had led to the jury's finding of the aggravated circumstance of "future
dangerousness,"9 directly paving the way to his sentence of death.
Since Smith was unable to demonstrate "cause" for his procedural
default and because he had not made a substantial showing (in the
Court's view) that the constitutional violation "undermined the accuracy
of the guilt or sentencing determination," 97 his Fifth Amendment claim
was never addressed and he was executed shortly after the decision
came down.9"
A year later, in 1987, the Court held that, unlike a direct appeal,
a habeas petitioner has no "right to counsel when mounting collateral
attacks." 99  Far more serious, however, was its 1989 decision in
Teague v. Lane'° holding that new constitutional rules will not be
applied retroactively to invalidate final state convictions on federal
habeas review. With this decision the Court appeared to embark upon
a course leading to virtually complete abandonment of the principle that
federal habeas corpus must be available to enforce all constitutional
rights.'O0
Frank Teague, an African American, was convicted of armed
robbery and attempted murder by an all-white jury in Illinois. During
his trial, Teague's two motions for mistrial, based on the state's
92. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
93. Id.
94. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
95. Id. Smith's claim was that the introduction of his inculpatory statements made to a
court-appointed psychiatrist violated his Fifth Amendment privilege since he had not been
informed of his right to remain silent or that his statements might be used against him. Id. at
531-32.
96. Id. at 538.
97. Id. at 539.
98. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, DEATH Row, U.S.A. 5 (1993)
[hereinafter DEATH Row, U.S.A.].
99. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56 (1987). Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963), had long since established a constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal.
100. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (5-4 decision).
101. Perhaps indicative of the luke-warmth of the fifth vote of the Teague 5-4 majority,
Justice White opined: "if we are wrong in construing the reach of the habeas corpus statutes,
Congress can of course correct us;..." Id. at 317.
HABEAS CORPUS: THE NO-LONGER GREAT WRIT
exclusion of blacks from the jury, were denied. °2  Following
unsuccessful state appeals and denial of certiorari, Teague filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, which
subsequently denied relief. °3 A divided en banc panel of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Teague had not been
deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights by reason of the prosecutorial
use of peremptory challenges that resulted in the selection of a non-
representative jury.'" The court of appeals held that the new
constitutional rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Batson v.
Kentucky'05  was not retroactively applicable on habeas." 6  The
court of appeals also held that the "fair cross-section of the community"
requirement"'. was applicable only to the jury pool from which the
petit jury was selected, and not to the trial jury ultimately
empaneled.'0 s From the standpoint of habeas doctrinal analysis, the
first prong of the ratio decidendi was critical and the Supreme Court
affirmed on that basis.'09
Prior to Teague, the Court had ignored any distinction on the issue
of retroactivity as between direct and collateral (i.e., habeas) review,
even in cases where the new constitutional rule at issue constituted a
"clear break" with the past." °  Teague, the first case to draw a sharp
distinction between the two forms of review, barred the retroactive
application of such a "new rule" to all cases on collateral review.
Relying on the principle of finality, Justice O'Connor, in her plurality
opinion, declared that a "habeas court need only apply the constitutional
standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings took
place. ' 11
102. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (No. 87-5259).
103. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 293.
104. 820 F.2d 832 (1987). The Court of Appeals hearing was delayed pending the
Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Teague, 820 F.2d at
833 n.I. In Batson, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause barred the use of
peremptory challenges based on race in a criminal proceeding.
105. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
106. Teague, 820 F.2d at 836 (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986)). Allen, decided
just two months after Batson, held that Batson did not apply retroactively on collateral review
of convictions which became (like Teague) "final" before Batson was announced.
107. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940).
108. Teague, 820 F.2d at 837-43.
109. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300-01.
110. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300
(1967).
111. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Though variously interpreted, the Court has held that "a
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The Teague Court reserved the question of whether its holding
should be applied to capital cases. Later in the same year that Teague
was decided, the Court settled that issue by subjecting a capital case to
the same test." 2  The issue before the Court was whether the death
penalty for a mentally retarded adult was categorically prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment and, if not, whether the defendant was entitled to
a jury instruction as to the mitigating effect of mental retardation.
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor acknowledged the
applicability of Teague in capital cases, but nonetheless declared that
the governing rule as to mitigation here could be found in prior case
law. 113
In the face of Teague and its progeny, habeas petitioners now have
little choice but to couch their petitions as though fully governed by
prior constitutional precedent, avoiding arguments grounded on "new
rules." The success of the habeas petition may well depend less on its
merits than on whether it can persuade the court that relief is "dictated
by precedent."'"
Perhaps the crowning blow to habeas corpus practitioners generally
and capital defense lawyers in particular was struck on April 16, 1991,
with the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v. Zant."'  There,
the Court found that McCleskey, a death-row prisoner in Georgia, was
guilty of "abuse of the writ" by omitting from his prior state habeas
petitions and his first federal petition his claim that, under Massiah v.
decision announces a new rule 'if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final."' Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990)
(quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original)). Quwre: How many habeas cases are
likely to be "dictated" by prior case law? And what of the habeas petitioner on death row
whose life may turn on whether his petition is "dictated" by the state of constitutional law at
the time of his trial? See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
112. Penry, 492 U.S. at 329.
113. Id. at 314-19 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
114. In a dire prediction, one commentator wrote:
Today, Frank Teague is in prison, perhaps convicted unconstitutionally by an all-
white jury. His right to inquire into the constitutionality of his conviction has been
barred due to a procedural quibble that depends upon nothing more substantial than
a slippery notion of what constitutes a new rule. But Frank Teague is not the only
loser. The Teague bar may effectively slam the door on most federal review of state
criminal cases and permanently stunt the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence.
Elliot F. Krieger, Recent Developments, The Court Declines in Fairness - Teague v. Lane, 25
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 164, 181-82 (1990). For the most recent application of Teague,
applying the "new rule" doctrine so as to deny federal habeas relief, see Gilmore v. Taylor,
113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
115. I1 S. Ct. 1454(1991).
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United States,"6 the state's use of a jailhouse informant to elicit
inculpatory information" 7 against him violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel."' Among other responses, the State of Georgia
contended that McCleskey's presentation of a Massiah claim for the
first time in his second federal petition was an abuse of the writ barred
under the governing statute and rules." 9
Despite the wording of the habeas corpus statute, the fact that the
issue was never litigated in either the district court or the court of
appeals, the total absence of briefing by the parties, and the fact that the
respondent never even sought such a ruling, the Supreme Court handed
down an extraordinary decision. In the case of multiple habeas
petitions, the doctrine of "abuse of the writ" would now be governed by
the "cause and prejudice" standard of Wainwright v. Sykes. 2 ' The
Sykes standard henceforth would be "incorporated" into the abuse-of-
the-writ doctrine inasmuch as they "implicate nearly identical
116. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
117. McCleskey's Massiah claim was centered on a 2 1-page signed statement by the
informant, including alleged statements by McCleskey not only admitting, but boasting, about
the killing of an off-duty policeman which occurred in the course of a robbery. McCleskey,
I I I S. Ct. at 1459-60. After considerable effort and "piecing together the circumstances under
which the statement had been transcribed," McCleskey's counsel finally located one of the
jailers to testify to the fact that the informant "had been planted in the cell adjoining
McCleskey's." Id. at 1488 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1457. The federal district court granted habeas relief but was reversed by the
Eleventh Circuit McCleskey v. Zant, 890 F.2d 342 (1Ilth Cir. 1989). The Court of Appeals'
decision was based on petitioner's "deliberate abandonment" of the Massiah claim which,
having been included in his first state petition, was omitted from his first federal habeas
petition only to be reasserted in the second. McCleskey, Ill S. Ct. at 1461. The court adopted
this rationale in the teeth of the district court's findings that "at the first petition stage
McCleskey knew neither the existence of the [informant's] statement nor the identity of [the
jailer] ... " Id. at 1461.
119. Id. at 1460 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1982) and Rule 9(b) of the "Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases," 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982)). Section 2244(b) requires that the application for the
writ must be entertained whenever "the application alleges and is predicated on a factual or
other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the writ," provided
that the petitioner has not "deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground" on the earlier
application or "otherwise abused the writ." Rule 9 reads as follows:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the
merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of
the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the
writ.
As for the proposed changes to Section 2244 contained in the Biden Bill, supra note 32, see
infra note 188.
120. McCleskey, III S. Ct. at 1468.
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concerns .. .'" Not surprisingly, McCleskey never made it past the
''cause" test."'
With its decision in McCleskey, the zeal of the Rehnquist majority
to erect major roadblocks in the path of habeas corpus petitioners
became transparent. The facts found by the federal district court
remained essentially undisturbed.' 23  They clearly reflect direct
government complicity in deception and withholding of the very
information essential to the crafting of a proper petition based on a clear
Sixth Amendment violation. Far from illustrating abuse of the writ, the
facts in McCleskey reflect abuse of governmental power'24 and the
rewarding of such abuse by encouraging law enforcement authorities
and state officials to conceal the very evidence that might enable a
habeas petitioner to avoid the pitfalls of the new Sykes strict-liability
standard.
In a recent decision, the Court took the opportunity to constrict the
applicability of habeas relief still further. In Brecht v. Abrahamson,1
25
a razor-thin 5-4 majority of the Court (with Justice Stevens surprisingly
concurring) declared that constitutional error of the trial type may be
"harmless" even if the habeas court does not deem it harmless beyond
121. Id. For their part, the dissenting Justices (Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) found
ample cause and prejudice in the form of the State's "deceit," "disinformation," and "veil of
deception." Id. at 1487-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1474.
123. The Kennedy opinion gratuitously attacks the jailer's testimony as somewhat self-
contradictory on the facts essential to petitioner's Massiah claim. Id. at 1488 n.12. In fact, the
District Court found that he never wavered on the key issue of the removal of the informant to
the cell next to McCleskey. Id.
124. The dissenting Justices' opening statement reflects the juridical "aftershock" of this
seemingly seismic change:
Today's decision departs drastically from the norms that inform the proper judicial
function. Without even the most casual admission that it is discarding longstanding
legal principles, the Court radically redefines the content of the "abuse of the writ"
doctrine, substituting the strict-liability "cause and prejudice" standard of
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), for the good-faith "deliberate
abandonment" standard of Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). This
doctrinal innovation, which repudiates a line of judicial decisions codified by
Congress in the governing statute and procedural rules, was by no means foreseeable
when the petitioner in this case filed his first federal habeas application. Indeed, the
new rule announced and applied today was not even requested by respondent at any
point in this litigation. Finally, rather than remand this case for reconsideration in
light of its new standard, the majority performs an independent reconstruction of the
record, disregarding the factual findings of the District Court and applying its new
rule in a manner that encourages state officials to conceal evidence that would likely
prompt a petitioner to raise a particular claim on habeas.
Id. at 1477 (emphasis in original).
125. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
HABEAS CORPUS: THE NO-LONGER GREAT WRIT
a reasonable doubt.'26 The prosecutor's references to Brecht's silence
after being given Miranda warnings were found by the federal habeas
trial court to have violated Doyle v. Ohio.'27 As a "trial error," the
Doyle violation was viewed by the Court as unworthy of Chapman
analysis on habeas review since such a standard intrudes too much on
states' interests, not the least of which is "the finality of convictions that
have survived direct review within the state court system. ''18
The bleak and deteriorating picture of this habeas corpus
retrospective would not be complete without reference to Coleman v.
Thompson,'29  which was decided on June 24, 1991. Coleman's
volunteer lawyers, unfamiliar with Virginia appellate procedure, filed
their notice of appeal one day late. Without reaching the merits, the
Virginia Supreme Court issued its terse order dismissing the appeal
because of the attorneys' procedural mistake. 3 ° The Supreme Court
treated defense counsel's procedural oversight, clearly grounded in state
law, as sufficient to bar habeas corpus relief despite the complete
absence of any "full and fair hearing" on the merits of the appeal. The
6-3 majority opinion by Justice O'Connor emphasizes the respect that
federal courts owe the states and the states' procedural rules. 3 ' On
this non-constitutional and non-federal basis, the Court extended
complete deference to Virginia's procedural appellate procedure, and,
in so doing, sealed Mr. Coleman's fate on death row. This new
126. The rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), establishing the "harmless-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard" was held no longer applicable to cases on collateral
review, even though it remains the constitutional standard on direct review. Speaking for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared: "The principle that collateral review is different
from direct review resounds throughout our jurisprudence." Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719.
127. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
128. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1720 (citing Wainwright v. Sykes and McCleskey v. Zant as
support).
129. 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). Coleman, a coal-miner, was convicted of rape and capital
murder. His grounds for appeal were persuasive, including evidence that one of his trial jurors
had said that he wanted to sit on the case so that he could "nail" the defendant. See Coleman
v. Thompson, 895 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
130. See Coleman, 111 S. CL at 2553. The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed Coleman's
notice of appeal from the state habeas court as untimely under Rule 5:9(a) of the Virginia
Supreme Court Rules, which provided for a thirty-day limitation period "after entry of final
judgment or other appealable order... " See Coleman, 895 F.2d at 142 (citing VA. S. CT. R.
5:9(a)). The habeas writ was denied on September 4, 1986, and the Clerk recorded the Order
on September 9, 1986. Id. Coleman filed his notice of appeal on October 7, 1986. Id. The
state habeas court refused to correct the date of the "judgment" to September 9, 1986, insisting
that final judgment was entered on September 4, 1986. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Virginia ruled: "[T]he motion to dismiss is granted and the petition for appeal is dismissed."
Id.
131. Coleman, 111 S. Ct. at 2564-65.
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"federalism" was denounced by Justice Blackmun as bearing "little
resemblance to that adopted by the framers of the Constitution."' 32
He lamented what he characterized as the Court's ongoing "crusade to
erect petty procedural barriers in the path of any state prisoner seeking
review of his federal constitutional claims" and its transformation of
"the duty to protect federal rights into a self-fashioned obligation."
133
In summary, Wainwright v. Sykes left open the question of whether
the "deliberate bypass" standard still applied to a fact-pattern such as
that presented in Fay, in which the failure to make a suppression claim
based on a Miranda-rights violation led to the loss of appeal rights.
34
The Sykes court nonetheless condemned "the sweeping language of Fay
v. Noia, going far beyond the facts of the case eliciting it.' 35  The
Court's decision in Coleman removed whatever doubt may have
lingered as to the continued efficacy of the rule in Fay v. Noia after
Sykes.' 36 Stressing the point that Fay was based on a misconception
of federal/state relations that undervalued the importance of state
procedural rules, the Coleman Court held:
We now make it explicit: In all cases in which a state prisoner has
defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an
independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas
review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.'37
With its decisions in Coleman and Stone v. Powell, the Court
added another lock on the federal courthouse door, barring access to
federal habeas corpus. In Stone v. Powell in 1976, the Court stressed
the principle of a "full and fair hearing" on the merits in the state
appellate courts as a basis for precluding relitigation of these issues in
federal collateral proceedings. 3  With its decision in Coleman v.
Thompson fifteen years later, the Court treated the inadvertent failure
of the prisoner to obtain a "full and fair hearing" on the merits as a
basis for preclusion as well.' 39 In the vernacular, this is known as a
132. Id. at 2569, 2571 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id.
134. 433 U.S. at 88 n.12.
135. Id. at 87-88.
136. See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1986). See supra text
accompanying notes 88-93.
137. Coleman, 11I S. Ct. at 2565.
138. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
139. Coleman, I1I S. Ct. at 2565.
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"lose-lose" situation, and it is a highly costly one for death-row
petitioners in particular.
IV. Habeas Corpus: Some Bright Spots
While the foregoing clearly demonstrates the recent increasing
constriction of habeas corpus, a more complete "balance sheet" reflects
some signs of continued vitality of the Great Writ, at least in egregious
criminal cases. Thus, the Burger-Rehnquist Court has found it
appropriate, sometimes even unanimously, to grant habeas relief in the
following situations: a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim of
insufficient evidence to support a conviction; 40 a prisoner on death
row who was convicted on information obtained from him by a state-
employed psychiatrist in the absence of counsel;'' a petitioner who
was sentenced to life imprisonment for- cashing a $100 fraudulent
check;'42 a death-row prisoner who was sentenced by a jury instructed
that it need not find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in
order to convict; 43 a prisoner whose conviction resulted from his
claiming his right to remain silent after the police repeatedly advised
him of his constitutional right and assured him that he could refuse to
talk to them without fear of consequences;' a defendant who was
indicted by a grand jury from which blacks were excluded;' 45 a
capital prisoner who was sentenced by a jury that was erroneously
instructed by the trial judge that, in passing the death sentence, it could
not consider the defendant's brain damage, his cooperation with the
police, or his potential for rehabilitation; 46 a defendant who was
incompetently represented at trial; 47 and a capital prisoner who was
sentenced to die by a jury where the jury commissioner, on instructions
from the district attorney, had intentionally excluded women and
African-Americans. 148
Perhaps the most significant positive decision since Stone v. Powell
is Kimmelman v. Morrison,149  a case in which ineffective
140. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
141. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
142. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
143. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
144. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1985).
145. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1985).
146. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989).
147. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986). See discussion infra notes 149-56 and
accompanying text.
148. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
149. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
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representation of counsel was the core issue. Having failed to conduct
any pretrial discovery, counsel for a rape defendant neglected to make
a timely suppression motion. 50  After exhausting his state court
appellate remedies, the defendant sought habeas relief in the federal
courts, claiming violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel in that his attorney's incompetence permitted the introduction
of illegally-seized evidence against him. 5' After modest success in
the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the
government's argument that the Stone v. Powell rationale would apply
equally to a Sixth Amendment claim based on the failure of defense
counsel to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently.'52 It is
one thing, the Court held, to release the states from the burden of the
"costs" of the exclusionary rule under the Stone analysis; 53 it is
something very different where Sixth Amendment requirements have
not been met, in which case the very legitimacy of our criminal justice
system is put at risk as a result of constitutionally-deficient counsel,
even given a "full and fair" hearing before state courts. 54  In the
course of its opinion, the Court in Kimmelman explained that, unlike the
Fourth Amendment which confers no "trial right," the Sixth
Amendment confers a "fundamental right" upon criminal defendants, a
right which "assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our
adversary process."' 55  The Court reasoned that since a Sixth
Amendment violation would often go unremedied except on habeas
corpus review, "restricting the litigation of some Sixth Amendment
claims to trial and direct review would seriously interfere with an
accused's right to effective representation.' 56
Shortly after its decision in Kimmelman, the Court once again
relaxed the bar against habeas relief in an ineffective representation
case. In Murray v. Carrier,'57 which reaffirmed the "cause and
prejudice" test' as a prerequisite for federal habeas relief, the Court
held that while counsel's ignorance or inadvertence is not adequate
150. Id. at 369.
151. Id. at 371.
152. Id. at 374.
153. Stone was distinguishable because the exclusionary rule at issue there was viewed
purely as a prophylactic measure rather than as a constitutional right. See id. at 375-80.
154. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 378, n.3 (citing Stone, 428 U.S. at 494).
155. Id. at 374 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
156. Id. at 378.
157. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
158. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes
72-76.
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"cause," ineffective assistance of counsel is.' 59 The Court recognized
that "the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of
cause and prejudice must yield to the imperative of correcting a
fundamentally unjust incarceration."' 6 ° The majority opinion goes a
step further and declares: "Accordingly, we think that in an
extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of
cause for the procedural default."''
Other cases attest to the fact that, as with Mark Twain, the reputed
death of habeas corpus is greatly exaggerated; it has shown some
significant signs of life, even vitality. The Court in Jackson v.
Virginia'62 refused the opportunity presented to apply Stone so as to
bar habeas corpus review of a due process denial grounded on a claim
of insufficient evidence. In contrast to the exclusionary rule at issue in
Stone, the issue in Jackson was deemed to be "central to the basic
question of guilt or innocence."' 63  Similarly, in Rose v. Mitchell, "'
the Court declined to extend the rule in Stone to preclude habeas review
of an equal protection claim of racial discrimination in the process of
grand-jury foreman selection. Here, again, the Court's majority resisted
the government's argument that the Stone analysis was equally
applicable to other judge-made rules, and restricted Stone to its narrow,
exclusionary-rule context. To do otherwise, the Court said, would be
incompatible with the controlling habeas law. 65
In Boyde v. California,' the Court clarified the standard for
reviewing a habeas claim that a single jury instruction was ambiguous
and therefore subject to an erroneous interpretation, impermissibly
restricting the jury's consideration of "constitutionally relevant
evidence."' 67  Boyde argued that the trial court's instruction on
California's "catch-all" factor for determining the death penalty
excluded certain mitigating evidence from the jury's consideration. 68
The Court agreed, emphasizing that "[t]he Eighth Amendment requires
159. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
160. Id. at 495 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)).
161. Id. at 496.
162. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
163. Id. at 323.
164. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
165. Id. at 562-64.
166. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
167. Id. at 380.
168. Id. at 376.
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that the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant
mitigating evidence," and that such evidence was clearly
"constitutionally relevant."' 69
As recently as April 1993, the State of Michigan failed in its
attempt to insulate Miranda violations against federal habeas review.
In Withrow v. Williams, 170 the majority of the Court held that the bar
of Stone v. Powell would not be extended to claimed Miranda errors at
trial. The facts in Withrow were compelling - a police sergeant
threatened to "lock up" defendant Williams during a stationhouse
interrogation about a double murder, whereupon Williams made a
number of incriminating statements.'' After being given his Miranda
rights, he made more inculpatory statements. 172 The federal district
court granted habeas relief, concluding that all of Williams' inculpatory
statements, both before and after his receipt of the Miranda warnings,
should have been suppressed as involuntary under the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 73  The court of appeals
affirmed. 74  The question on which the Supreme Court granted
certiorari was the following: Assuming a finding of a Miranda
violation, where the petitioner has had one full and fair opportunity to
raise the Miranda claim in state court, should collateral review of the
same claim on a habeas corpus petition be precluded? Speaking for the
majority, Justice Souter answered in the negative, holding that the
Miranda prophylactic rule is enforceable by way of habeas corpus
despite Stone's restriction. ' 7' By the narrowest of margins, the Court
refused to extend Stone's limitation on the availability of habeas relief
to Withrow's claim that his conviction rested on statements obtained in
violation of the Miranda safeguards. The majority reasoned that the
Stone rule was based on prudential concerns counseling against applying
169. Id. at 377-78. While Chief Justice Rehnquist seeks to confine the Boyde standard to
capital cases, it should be noted that Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991), makes the
Rehnquist position untenable in that this later decision reaffirmed the Boyde standard in a non-
capital case. In McGuire, the Court majority found that the particular erroneous instruction at
issue did not in fact give rise to a constitutional violation. But "the very fact that the Court
scrutinized the instruction belies any assertion that erroneous instructions can violate due
process only in capital cases." Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2121 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
170. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
171. Id. at 1748-49.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 1749.
174. 944 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1991).
175. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1751-55.
HABEAS CORPUS: THE NO-LONGER GREAT WRIT
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule on habeas review. '76 On the
other hand, the Miranda (Fifth Amendment) rule, while similarly
"prophylactic" in nature, safeguards "a fundamental trial right"' 77 and
embodies "principles of humanity and civil liberty ...,,7 While the
exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio 179 is intended to deter future search
and seizure violations, Miranda protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, is personal to the defendant, and
applies presently and immediately at trial. 80 In addition, the Withrow
majority noted that whereas the exclusionary rule has the effect of
precluding the use of evidence which is generally reliable, the exact
opposite is true where statements are obtained from unwarned
defendants in the inherently coercive atmosphere of police custody. ' '
The foregoing review of cases in which federal habeas relief was
granted leads inexorably to the conclusion that such relief is being
confined to cases where there has been no procedural default, where the
cause-and-prejudice test has been met, or where there is a colorable
claim of actual innocence. Newly discovered evidence and intervening
changes in the law do not suffice. Habeas successes have clearly
become the exception, not the rule." 2
V. "Finality," "Federalism" and "Scarce Judicial Resources":
Rationale or Pretext?
In his dissenting opinion in Brecht v. Abramson, Justice White
stated:
Our habeas jurisprudence is taking on the appearance of a confused
patchwork in which different constitutional rights are treated
according to their status, and in which the same constitutional right
176. Id. at 1750.
177. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
178. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1751-55 (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544
(1897)).
179. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
180. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1750, 1753.
181. Id. at 1753 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976)).
182. In a burst of optimism totally unwarranted by recent case law, Justice Kennedy found
the habeas corpui glass "half-full": "With the exception of Fourth Amendment violations that
a petitioner has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court, ... the writ
today appears to extend to all dispositive constitutional claims presented in a proper procedural
manner ...." McCleskey, Ill S. Ct. at 1462 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)). Writing for the majority in McCleskey, Justice
Kennedy affirmed the denial of the writ below on grounds of "abuse of the writ," the need for
"finality," and the need to conserve "scarce federal judicial resources." Id. at 1467-70. See
supra text accompanying notes 115-24.
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is treated differently depending on whether its vindication is sought
on direct or collateral review. I believe this picture bears scant
resemblance either to Congress' design or to our own
precedents. 183
Terming the crazy-quilt pattern of recent habeas corpus law "a
confused patchwork" is a masterpiece of understatement. In fact, the
Supreme Court has persisted in demeaning the constitutional etiology
and high purpose of the Great Writ. In lieu of a robust bulwark of
individual freedom and justice, the Writ has been reduced to a kind of
"Maginot Line" which has been easily and regularly breached by a
veritable blitzkrieg of assaults by Burger-Rehnquist Court majorities.
In a pattern reminiscent of Justice Potter Stewart's memorable language
in Furman v. Georgia,'84 the Court's habeas decisions raise the
spectre of being "wantonly and .. . freakishly imposed."'85  The
bottom line is that habeas corpus proceedings have all too often resulted
in "habeas corpse."' 86
The reason for this constitutional metamorphosis is not difficult to
identify. In direct response to the resuscitation and proliferation of the
death-penalty by the state legislatures after Furman, criminal defense
practitioners have increasingly and, sometimes repeatedly, resorted to
habeas corpus proceedings as a means of preserving their clients' lives.
Most of the cases reviewed above were brought on behalf of death-row
prisoners, some of them protesting factual as well as "legal"
innocence.' 87  The defense of these capital cases, usually on a pro
bono basis, has frequently reflected the highest standards of the criminal
defense bar. But these efforts have proven unavailing in the face of the
Court's increasingly rigid adherence to policy objectives having little in
common with the spirit and letter of the Writ.
Under the general rubric of "abuse of the Writ," '88 the Court has
183. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1728 (White, J., dissenting).
184. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
185. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
186. See David Bruck & Leslie Harris, Habeas Corpse: The Right to Appeal Under Fire,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 15 & 22, 1991, at 10.
187. See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 23, 36 (1987) (concluding that some twenty-
three innocent defendants have been executed in the United States in this century, including
one, James Adams, who was executed in Florida on May 10, 1984). For a rebuttal to this
study, see Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988).
188. This term was first used by the Court in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1963). It is now codified as part of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1982). See supra note 119. On
August 6, 1993, Senator Joseph Biden introduced "A Bill to Reform Habeas Corpus." Biden
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developed a habeas jurisprudence replete with minefields such as "cause
and prejudice," non-retroactivity of new constitutional principles, and
proof of "actual innocence." The rational for its departure from
longstanding habeas principles and doctrine has been candidly set forth
in several of its more recent decisions. The reasons most frequently
given for the Court's retreat from its earlier supportive and expansive
view of the Great Writ are "finality," "federalism," and the burden upon
"scarce federal resources." Each of these rationales merits separate
attention.
A. Finality
The finality argument is, facially at least, the most persuasive.
"Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent
effect."' 9 In the words of Justice Kennedy, "[o]ne of the law's very
objects is the finality of its judgments. Neither innocence nor just
punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known."' 90
The principle of finality has found its way into a number of
Supreme Court decisions where habeas relief was denied. 9' The
common practice of federal reexamination of state convictions - the
very raison d'etre of habeas corpus, both in terms of Article I, Section
9, and its statutory expansion in 1867 - was characterized in Murray
v. Carrier as "frustrat[ing] . . . 'both the States' sovereign power to
punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional
rights.'"'92
Finality of convictions is also advanced as the main reason for
distinguishing between direct and collateral review. Direct review, of
course, is the principal means for challenging a conviction. The federal
Bill, supra note 32. This proposed legislation, for the first time, limits prisoners to filing a
single federal habeas appeal within a time limit of six months, subject to certain exceptions.
What is striking about this new strict time limit is the fact that more exceptions are provided in
cases of a sentence other than death than in cases of death-row prisoners. The Biden Bill has
received the "strong support" of the Clinton Administration. See Remarks Announcing the
Anti-Crime Initiative and an Exchange with Reporters, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1602
(Aug. i, 1993). The pertinent portions of the Biden Bill are set forth in Appendix A, infra.
189. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989). "It is, I believe, a matter of fundamental
import that there be a visible, litigable aspect of the criminal process. Finality in the criminal
law is an end which must always be kept in plain view." Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 690 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
190. McCleskey, 11l S. Ct. at 1468.
191. See, e.g., Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127
(1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
192. Murray, 477 U.S. at 487 (citing Engle, 456 U.S. at 128).
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courts, according to this view, are "not forums in which to relitigate
state trials."' 93 The Supreme Court has stated:
When the process of direct review - which, if a federal question
is involved, includes the right to petition this Court for a writ of
certiorari - comes to an end, a presumption of finality and legality
attaches to the conviction and sentence. The role of federal habeas
proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights
are observed, is secondary and limited. '94
The rule barring retroactivity in habeas cases which was announced
in Teague v. Lane95 is tied directly to the finality principle. The
"new rule" doctrine laid down in Teague "validates reasonable good-
faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts ... and
thus effectuates the States' interest in the finality of criminal convictions
and fosters comity between federal and state courts."' 96  Thus,
finality, "the rule of law," "comity," and federalism are joined in a
single judicial-policy package.
Finality in criminal justice is certainly a laudable goal. Few would
argue against it. But the fact that "finality" has risen to the dominant
and controlling position that it now occupies in our habeas corpus
framework serves to create a (perhaps intended) chilling effect on
habeas practitioners. As the finality objective has risen to the apex of
the habeas pyramid over the past decade and a half, such heretofore
bedrock constitutional principles of fundamental fairness, equity,
97
and the integrity of the criminal justice system have receded in
193. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983).
194. Id. "Perpetual disrespect for the finality of convictions disparages the entire criminal
justice system." McCleskey, II1 S. Ct. at 1469.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 100-11. Subject to two very narrow exceptions, a
"new rule" of constitutional law which is announced after a judgment of conviction is final
cannot provide a basis for federal relief. The Teague exceptions to non-retroactive application
of new constitutional rules include: (i) cases where the defendant's conduct is "beyond the
power of the criminal-law making authority to proscribe;" and (2) cases involving the absence
of a "procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished." Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313 (citing Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692).
196. Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2116 (citing Butler v. McKellar, 110S. Ct. 1212, 1217
(1990)).
197. "[H]abeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable principles."
Fay, 372 U.S. at 438. See also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1985). The
"deliberate bypass" rule of Fay, see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text, is a clear
reflection of the core equitable principle of "unclean hands." Even in the face of abusive or
successive use of the writ, however, the Court professes adherence to a "miscarriage of justice
exception" which is grounded in the "equitable discretion" of a habeas court to see to it "that
federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons." Herrera v.
Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993).
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importance in habeas jurisprudence. Indeed, in some cases, they have
all but disappeared.
In the capital sentencing context, the policy interest in making
convictions "final" is not only inapplicable,'98 it is also highly
inappropriate and potentially barbaric. The perceived need for "finality"
in the context of capital cases does more than put an end to the
"litigation;" it puts an end to the litigator. If there is any area of our
law wherein the principle of fundamental fairness should be paramount
above all others, certainly well above the purely pragmatic objective of
"ending the litigation," '' it is in capital punishment cases or, indeed,
in any case where the liberty of the petitioner hangs in the balance. At
the heart of the Great Writ is our system of criminal justice which is
committed to suspending "[c]onventional notions of finality of
litigation . . where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of
constitutional rights is alleged."200
In the name of "finality," a habeas petitioner is no longer free to
assert newly discovered evidence (Herrera), new law (Teague), or even
ineffective representation by counsel (Coleman). Justice Kennedy,
speaking for the majority in McCleskey v. Zant, was forced to concede
that "[m]uch confusion exists ... on the standard for determining when
a petitioner abuses the writ." '' He continued in a similar vein:
Although the standard is central to the proper determination of
many federal habeas corpus actions, we have had little occasion to
define it. Indeed, there is truth to the observation that we have
198. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
199. The following observation by Justice Harlan (in dissent) in Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting), is often quoted by the pro-finality Justices:
Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that
there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and
that attention will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from
error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the
community.
See also Engle, 456 U.S. at 127. Ten years later, Justice Powell opined similarly:
At some point, the law must convey to those in custody that a wrong has been
committed, that consequent punishment has been imposed, that one should no longer
look back with the view to resurrecting every imaginable basis for further litigation
but rather should look forward to rehabilitation and to become a constructive citizen.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 262 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). For the
prisoner on death row, such arguments are totally meaningless and clearly inappropriate.
200. Sanders, 373 U.S. at 8.
201. McCleskey, Il1 S. Ct. at 1461.
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defined abuse of the writ in an oblique way, through dicta and
denials of certiorari petitions or stay applications.202
It would be difficult to conceive of a more stinging commentary on
the Court's recent efforts at re-writing the common-law of habeas
corpus, particularly coming as it does from a Court majority which has
been a major architect of the confusion. Definition here has hardly
been "oblique;" it has been ad hoc and case-by-case. In its efforts to
avert and deter "abuse of the writ," the present Court has itself abused
the writ most sorely.20 3
B. Federalism
The federalism (or comity) argument springs from the familiar
doctrine that federal as well as state courts are equally obligated to
enforce and protect rights secured by the Constitution. Since it would
be "unseemly" for a federal court to upset a state court conviction in
our dual system of government, the "comity principle" comes into play,
and "teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly
within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with
concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an
opportunity to pass upon the matter." 2°4  The concern here is that a
state prisoner incarcerated pursuant to a state court judgment can only
be released when a federal court, in effect, "nullifies" the judgment."5
However, from as far back as the passage of the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867,206 problems concerning the relationship between federal
202. Id. (citing Witt v. Wainright, 470 U.S. 1039, 1043 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
203. In the course of engrafting the Wainwright v. Sykes "cause and prejudice" rule on the
abuse-of-the writ preclusionary rule, the Court majority in' McCleskey (Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) quoted from the Court's earlier
pronouncement in Woodward v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377 (1984) (per curiam) with obvious
approval: "Federal Courts should not continue to tolerate - even in capital cases - this type
of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus." McCleskey, III S. Ct. at 1471. This is followed,
somewhat anomalously, by reiteration of the axiomatic proposition that "It]he writ of habeas
corpus is one of the centerpieces of our liberties." This, in turn, is followed by an almost
predictable "but," namely: "But the writ has potentialities for evil as well as for good." Id.
(quoting in part from dictum in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 512 (1953) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.)).
204. Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950), overruled by Fay, 372 U.S. at 435-36, to
the extent that that decision may be said to stand for the proposition that federal habeas relief
is barred to a state prisoner who has failed timely to seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court
from an adverse state decision.
205. "in habeas ... ordering the prisoner's release invalidates the judgment of conviction
and renders ineffective the state rule relied upon to sustain that judgment." Fay, 372 U.S. at
469.
206. See supra note 39.
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and state courts have been clearly foreseeable. Indeed, such tension
emerged quickly. In Ex parte Bridges,"7 Justice Bradley, sitting as
a Circuit Justice, ruled that a convicted state prisoner who had sought
neither direct appellate nor habeas relief in the Georgia state courts was
eligible for habeas relief if he could prove the unconstitutionality of his
conviction.2' 8 This broad view of habeas relief was later specifically
adopted by the full Court in Ex Parte Royall,09 in which habeas was
sought in advance of trial. The Court, speaking through the first Justice
Harlan, held:
[W]here a person is in custody, under process from a State court of
original jurisdiction, for an alleged offence against the laws of such
State, and it is claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in
violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court
has a discretion whether it will discharge him, upon habeas corpus,
in advance of his trial ...
The Court nevertheless demonstrated restraint and cautioned against the
exercise of its broad habeas powers until the state court proceedings
were exhausted. This was probably the first example, in the context of
habeas corpus law, of judicial restraint in the name of comity. Royall
and succeeding cases2" created a pattern of federal deference to state
criminal trial and appellate proceedings which had to be exhausted
before federal habeas corpus would be entertained. The principle was
ultimately codified by Congress as 28 U.S.C. § 2254.212
207. 4 F. Cas. 98 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1875) (No. 1862).
208. Id. Justice Bradley held open this possibility even though Bridges' judgment was not
"final" under the state's criminal procedure. Bridges was discharged on the grounds that the
charge of which he stood convicted (perjury) was one which was exclusively cognizable in the
federal courts.
209. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
210. Id. at 252-53. Both Bridges and Royall require historical perspective. The Habeas
Corpus Act of 1867, supra note 39, which extended federal habeas corpus to state prisoners
must be understood against the background of the post-Civil War period. The Reconstruction
Congress was seeking to supervise the former states of the Confederacy with the strictest of
scrutiny. Indeed, this historical perspective informs as to the breadth intended by the Act,
whose "expansive language and imperative tone, viewed against the background of post-Civil
War efforts in Congress to deal severely with the States of the former Confederacy, would
seem to make inescapable the conclusion that Congress was enlarging the habeas remedy as
previously understood, not only in extending its coverage to state prisoners, but also in making
its procedures more efficacious." Fay, 372 U.S. at 415.
211. See also Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); Reid v. Jones, 187 U.S. 153
(1902); Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231 (1895); Pepke v. Cronan, 155 U.S. 100 (1892);
Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1892).
212. Under the statute, a habeas petitioner must have "exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State ... [unless] there is either an absence of available State corrective
process" or circumstances are such as to render such process "ineffective to protect the rights
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As stressed by the Court itself, however, comity does not require
the removal or denial of judicial power; rather, the exhaustion
precondition is merely "one which relates to the appropriate exercise of
power." '213  It is a rule of deferral, not of abstention. Clearly, the
common law of habeas corpus leaves no doubt that neither federalism
nor comity dictates that a state court's determination of the merits of a
criminal case is entitled to conclusivity.
214
With its decision in Wainwright v. Sykes,2t 5 in which the Court
began its retreat from its expansive reading of habeas corpus, the
federalism/comity principle became an increasingly dominant factor in
its decisionmaking. Sykes reflected the Court's concern that liberal
construction of the writ's application would tend to dilute the
significance of the criminal trial itself. The Sykes majority reasoned
that the trial focuses upon one time and place "in order to decide,
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or
innocence.,
216
Despite its continued recognition of the fact that the writ of habeas
corpus "holds an honored position in our jurisprudence," '2 t7 within five
years after Sykes the Court was bemoaning its "special costs on our
federal system. Starting from its major premise that primary
authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law lies with the states
which bear the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights,
the Court sounded the following warning note: "Federal intrusions into
state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish
offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional
rights. 21 9
of the prisoner." 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b) (West Supp. 1994).
213. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939) (emphasis added); see also Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
214. The closest the Court came to this approach was in the now discredited decision in
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
215. See supra text accompanying note 72.
216. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90. Procedural default, which was targeted in Sykes, as well as the
Court's abuse-of-the-writ jurisprudence, are directly implicated in the overriding federalism
argument. Both "seek to vindicate the State's interest in the finality of its criminal judgments."
McCleskey, I I I S. Ct. at 1470.
217. Engle, 456 U.S. at 126.
218. Id. at 128. "We must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost
society the right to punish admitted offenders." Id. at 127.
219. Id. at 128 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-65 (Powell, J.,
concurring)). Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and four other Justices, carries the
argument even further by contending that the "ready availability of habeas corpus" may well
serve to diminish the sanctity of the criminal defendant's constitutional safeguards "by
suggesting to the trial participants that there may be no need to adhere to those safeguards
HABEAS CORPUS: THE No-LONGER GREAT WRIT
In the setting of abuse-of-the-writ, the Court is, or ought to be,
striking a proper balance between federalism and fair review of
constitutional deprivations. In the typical habeas claim, the petitioner
will surely have raised his constitutional claims on direct appeal. Why
not? Why delay relief and his own release from custody? The abuse-
of-the-writ doctrine presupposes that the habeas petitioner has raised all
such claims in his (state) direct appeal. If one or several of his claims
were omitted from a state habeas petition, this hardly undermines the
federalism/comity doctrine.
The "abuse" principle is aimed at claims withheld from a prior
federal habeas proceeding. In that context, the balance sought to be
struck between the goals of "finality" and fair collateral review makes
"federalism" irrelevant. The issue is whether a federal court should
hear a claim that was withheld from another federal court. Within this
framework, the principle of comity is totally irrelevant.
Only in the case where a constitutional claim has been omitted
from the state appeal process or where a state procedural default has
occurred, whether by reason of excusable or inexcusable oversight, is
federalism clearly implicated. Ostensibly, in order to reduce federal
"intrusions into state trials," which only serve to "frustrate the States'
sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to
honor constitutional rights,"22 the Court has adopted the cause-and-
prejudice test so as to assure federal deference.22' Under this
increasingly rigid rule,222 the Court has invariably barred habeas
review where a procedural default has occurred and the state court's
decision rested on "independent and adequate" state grounds.223
In fact, the interests of true federalism, as set forth in our
constitutional framework, are badly served by this heavy emphasis on
during the trial itself." Id. at 127. Such a Machiavellian suggestion carried the federalism
argument to, and possibly beyond, its credible limits.
220. Id. at 128.
221. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87. "We believe the adoption of the ... rule in this situation
will have the salutary effect of making the state trial on the merits the 'main event,' so to
speak, rather that a 'tryout on the road' for what will later be the determinative federal habeas
hearing." Id. at 90.
222. In order to overcome the Sykes bar, the state prisoner must demonstrate both "cause"
for the default and "prejudice" as a result of the unconstitutional violation.
223. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986);
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991). By
1991, the Court had all but overruled the "deliberate bypass" test laid down in Fay v. Noia.
"Fay was based on a conception of federal/state relations that undervalued the importance of
state procedural rules. The several cases after Fay that applied the cause and prejudice
standard to a variety of state procedural defaults represent a different view." Coleman, Il1 S.
Ct. at 2565.
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cost-effectiveness thinly disguised as "federalism." The judicial
principle of federalism was never intended to insulate state courts from
federal intervention, regardless of how legitimate that intercession might
be. To the contrary, federalism was developed as a judicial doctrine the
purpose of which was to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens
- particularly, but not solely, Fourteenth Amendment rights - against
the states.224
The co-equality of the branches of government does not have an
equivalent "separation of powers" within the judiciary, federal and state.
The driving engine of our federal system is set forth in unmistakable
terms in Article VI of the United States Constitution: "This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land: and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
225
The adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
enhanced federal authority still further at the clear expense of the states.
The passage of these Constitutional Amendments, taken in conjunction
with the nearly concomitant passage of the 1867 habeas statute and the
226Civil Rights Acts, created a wholly different "federalism." This
statutory admixture, aimed directly at safeguarding federal rights, was
clearly intended to "interpose the federal courts between the States and
the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights - to protect the
people from unconstitutional action. 227
The Sykes-Engle-Coleman trilogy reflects more of a zealous
attempt to reduce the burgeoning docket of habeas claims and appeals
than a doctrinal analysis of Constitutional federalism. The Court's
readiness to find grounds for abstention in the name of prismatic views
of "federalism" does not wash. History and the Court's own case law
teach the contrary.228
224. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 330-50 (2d ed. 1988); GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 882-93 (12th ed. 1991). In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat) 264, 415-16 (1821), Chief Justice Marshall observed that if state courts were the final
jurisdiction over federal causes of action, the result would be a "hydra in government, from
which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed."
225. U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added).
226. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 (West Supp. 1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West Supp.
1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (West Supp. 1994). Sections 1983 and 1985(3) are derived directly
from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13.
227. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); see also Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10
(1984) (citing Mitchum).
228. It is worth recalling the opinion of one of the Court's more "deferential" Justices,
Felix Frankfurter, who, in his separate opinion in Brown v. Allen, declared that federal habeas
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The Court's recent federal habeas jurisprudence has transformed
federalism into its opposite. In the short span of fifteen years, there has
been a distinct tilt of the Burger-Rehnquist majority away from strict
enforcement of the federal constitutional rights of criminal defendants
and in favor of state courts' sovereignty and "finality." Decrying what
he characterizes as the Court's creation of "a Byzantine morass of
arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the vindication
of federal rights," '229 Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices Marshall
and Stevens) has declared:
[D]isplaying obvious exasperation with the breadth of federal habeas
doctrine and the expansive protection afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness in state criminal
proceedings, the Court today continues its crusade to erect petty
procedural barriers in the path of any state prisoner seeking review
of his federal constitutional claims.23°
C. Scarcity of Resources
Scarcity of resources is the least persuasive of the Court's
rationales for narrowing availability of habeas relief. Readily reducible
to a cost/benefit balance sheet, this rationale has more in common with
prudential accounting than jurisprudential analysis. However, given the
Court's repeated resort to this principle in its recent habeas
jurisprudence, it merits serious attention.
With its growing emphasis on the "costs" of habeas review, the
Court majority, speaking through Justice Kennedy, has declared that
"[f]ederal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on scarce federal
judicial resources, and threatens the capacity of the system to resolve
primary disputes. 23' Justice Kennedy is quite correct. The burden
is a heavy one. What he overlooks is fair attribution of the major
source of this burden. Conveniently ignored by the Justices who rely
upon a "scarce judicial resources" argument is their own direct
responsibility for this pattern of squandering time and resources in the
typical habeas case.
Consider the following "road-map." The highway leading to
habeas relief, thanks to judicial activism (some might call it
jurisdiction "is not a case of a lower court sitting in judgment on a higher court. It is merely
one aspect of respecting the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution whereby federal law is
higher than State law." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 510 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
229. Coleman, I ll S. Ct. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
231. McCleskey, III S. Ct. at 1469.
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"legislation") by the Burger-Rehnquist Court, has become a veritable
minefield of procedural booby traps clearly intended to bar hearings on
the merits.232 The present roadblocks and detours with respect to
"cause and prejudice" analysis look something like this:2.
1. A prisoner files a second or subsequent habeas petition.
2. The government then pleads "abuse of the writ."
3. The government meets its burden if, "with clarity and
particularity, 234 it lays out the prior habeas history of
the case, identifies the claims that are raised for the first
time, and sets forth the basis for its claim of abuse.
4. Before the burden shifts to the petitioner to explain his
failure to raise his new claim earlier, however, the habeas
court will be called upon to make the following findings
of fact:
(a) that the state procedure at issue is valid and
applicable to the case;
(b) that the state has invoked the rule in the appellate
proceedings; and
(c) that the state court "clearly and expressly"
235
relied on the state procedural rule in rejecting the
prisoner's claim.
232. This pattern has, of course, escalated under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist
who has repeatedly and quite openly expressed his disappointment at the fact that capital
prisoners are not being executed with sufficient frequency and with all deliberate speed.
Placing this judicial deficiency squarely at the door of "excessive" resort to habeas corpus
review, the Chief Justice has urged "reform" of habeas review so as to substantially eviscerate
its effectiveness and availability. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle et a]., Rehnquist Is Still Hoping for
Habeas Reform, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 14, 1991, at 5; William H. Rehnquist, Remarks, A.B.A.
Midyear Meeting (Feb. 6, 1989) (on file with the Dickinson Law Review); Linda Greenhouse,
Supreme Court Puts Sharp Curbs on Repeated Death-Row Appeals, N.Y. TIMEs, April 17,
1991, at Al.
233. The outline which follows is based on the Court's most recent articulation of this
standard in McCleskey, I 1l S. Ct. at 1470. In the course of restating the current presumption
against adjudication on the merits both of claims defaulted in state court and claims defaulted
in the "first round" of federal habeas, Justice Kennedy offers a short course on the procedural
rabbit-warren for habeas petitioners developed by the present Court majority.
234. McCleskey, Ill S. Ct. at 1470.
235. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (a "procedural default does not bar
consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court
rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state
procedural bar") (citations omitted). But cf Coleman, I I S. Ct. at 2557-59.
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5. In addition to the foregoing, a diligent federal trial court
might seek to determine the following:236
(a) whether the state has consistently applied the
particular procedural rule under similar
circumstances;
(b) whether the rule serves a legitimate state interest;
and
(c) whether the rule places the defendant in the
dilemma of deciding whether to surrender one
constitutional right in order to exercise another.
6. The burden then shifts to the petitioner to show cause (as
defined in the Sykes-Engle-Carrier line of cases237 ) for
the procedural default.
7. If the petitioner succeeds in establishing such cause, then
the second Sykes prong of actual prejudice resulting
236. See Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform" of
Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments and Current Proposals,
55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 54 (1991).
237. Both "cause" and "prejudice" have generally received pinched interpretation since
Sykes. As to "cause," see, e.g., Delo v. Stokes, 110 S. Ct. 1880 (1990) (court abused discretion
in considering new claim which had been readily apparent and not raised until fourth federal
petition); Woodward v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377, 379 (1984) (per curiam) (absence of
explanation for asserting three claims in a second petition not raised in the first); and Antone v.
Dugger, 465 U.S. 200 (1984) (claims presented for first time in second petition rejected where
sought to be excused by counsel's lack of time to familiarize himself with case and to identify
all the claims in first habeas case). See also Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 (1989);
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986); Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U.S. 1132,
1132-33 (1986).
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directly from the constitutional violation23 must be
demonstrated.
8. If the district court determines "as a matter of law"'239
that the petitioner cannot meet the Sykes standard for
review, a habeas evidentiary hearing on cause and
prejudice will be denied.24 °
In the course of its opinion abandoning the harmless error rule of
Chapman14  as a standard for federal habeas review in Brecht v.
Abrahamson,2 42  the Court undertook a cost/benefit analysis. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, reasoned that the "costs" of applying
the Chapman standard "outweigh the additional deterrent effect, if any,
which would be derived from its application on collateral review."
2 43
The retrial of defendants whose convictions have been set aside
"imposes significant 'social costs,' including the expenditure of
additional time and resources for all the parties involved ...244
238. The case law on "actual prejudice" has been no less crimped. Recall that United
States v. Frady added the qualifying words "actual and substantial." Frady, 456 U.S. at 171-72
(failure on Frady's part to present colorable claim that he acted without malice). See also
William J. Stuntz & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in
Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 679, 684 (1990), which defines Sykes "prejudice"
as "some likelihood - greater than that sufficient to create a reasonable doubt but perhaps less
than 'more likely than not' - that the error or default affected the outcome of the
prosecution." In point of fact, the Sykes opinion expressly declined to define this vague
precept. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91. Since that decision the Court has only applied the term twice,
once in the context of a non-constitutional jury challenge, which left "the import of the term in
other situations ... an open question," Frady, 456 U.S. at 168; and a second time recently in
an ineffective assistance of counsel case involving failure to make a capital sentencing
objection which was supported by a subsequently overruled decision. Lockhart v. Fretwell,
113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). For an analysis concluding that Sykes "prejudice" is even more
stringent than the ineffective representation "prejudice" in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687-96 (1984), see Maria L. Marcus, Federal Habeas Corpus After State Court Default:
A Definition of Cause and Prejudice, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 663, 701-03 (1985).
239. McCleskey, III S. Ct. at 1470.
240. A theoretical "escape-hatch" is given lip-service by the McCleskey court - namely,
that even absent a showing of cause and prejudice, a petitioner's procedural default may
nonetheless be excused if a "fundamental miscarriage of justice" would likely result from the
court's failure to entertain the claim. Id. "Fundamental miscarriage of justice," in the view of
the Rehnquist majority, has been pared down to refer to one who is "actually innocent." See,
e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 135; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96; Harris, 489 U.S. at 263.
241. Chapman v. California; 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
242. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
243. Id. at 1721.
244. Id.
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In Withrow v. Williams,24 decided on the same day as Brecht,
Justice O'Connor cited the imposition of "substantial costs" as sufficient
reason for barring Miranda claims on habeas review. Whereas on
direct review, Justice O'Connor contends, the damage to the truth-
seeking function wrought by the Miranda rule is "an acceptable
sacrifice" out of respect for constitutional values and deterrence, on
collateral review the "balance between the costs and benefits shifts
compel[ling] Miranda's exclusion from habeas. 246  Justice
O'Connor concludes that, not unlike the exclusionary rule, "application
of Miranda's prophylactic rule on habeas consumes scarce judicial
resources on an issue unrelated to guilt or innocence.,
247
The authority most frequently cited for the "scarcity of resources"
rationale is Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte.248 In this federal habeas review of a search and seizure
claim,249 Justice Powell stressed the fact that Fourth Amendment
petitioners are "usually guilty," and that the evidence obtained from
searches and seizures, whether lawful or unlawful, is often "the clearest
proof of guilt."25  With this emphasis upon the "reliability" of the
inculpatory evidence, the justness of the incarceration, the core societal
value of protecting the "innocent," and the irrationality of a legal
system that serves "mechanistic rules quite unrelated to justice in a
particular case, '25 1 it was but a short step to condemning the
extension of habeas corpus as a drain upon limited judicial resources.
In the course of framing its "limited resources" argument, the
Court correctly noted that at the point where a habeas petition reaches
the federal court, the case has already been litigated in two or more
tiers of state courts.252 Since state courts are under no less a duty
than federal courts to protect constitutional rights, the habeas court is
245. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
246. Id. at 1759 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting in part). Citing her own
concurring opinion in Duckworth v. Eagan, 495 U.S. 195, 211 (1989), Justice O'Connor,
reflecting considerable skepticism as to Miranda's deterrent function, declared: "The awarding
of habeas relief years after conviction will often strike like lightning, and it is absurd to think
that this added possibility ... will have any appreciable effect on police training or behavior."
Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1760.
247. Id.
248. 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973).
249. This case was a harbinger for Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), wherein Justice
Powell, writing the majority opinion three years after Schneckloth, found the "costs" of
litigating the exclusionary rule by way of habeas review too high and stated that habeas corpus
should be limited primarily to protect the innocent.
250. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 258 (Powell, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 258-59.
252. Id. at 259.
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being called on to perform a task that should have been performed at
the state-court level. Why, then, repeat the process unnecessarily,
taxing limited federal judicial resources which are so sorely needed not
only in civil actions, but also in criminal trials and appeals "which
deserve our most careful attention"?2.. It strains credulity to believe
that our highest court would raise the scarcity of federal judicial
resources to such a level as to require federal habeas courts to
compromise their core function of protecting constitutional rights, but
it is impossible to read the Schneckloth-Powell-McCleskey line of cases
otherwise.
Despite the current ubiquity of habeas corpus petitions,254 access
to a full and fair determination of constitutional issues in federal courts
cannot fall victim to cost/benefit crassness. Even Justice Harlan, a
strong advocate of the finality-federalism principle whose dissents in
Fay and Sanders are often cited by the present Supreme Court
majority,2"  considered habeas corpus to be the fundamental
"safeguard against unlawful custody," requiring the federal courts to
address the same question: "[I]s the detention complained of 'in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States?
,,256
The responsibility of the federal courts is to apply the habeas
corpus "safeguard" against violations of the Constitution, federal law,
and treaties. The Constitution says nothing about the "costs" of
safeguarding personal liberty. Even the staunchest habeas corpus
revisionist will look long and hard for constitutional support for the
proposition that the hard judicial currency of the Great Writ may be
debased on the grounds of inadequate judicial resources. "Scarcity of
resources" - federal, state, or municipal - has never been accepted
by federal courts as a justification for failure to meet constitutional
requirements.257 Four decades of litigation of civil rights, voting
253. Id. at 260.
254. In 1990, more than 12,000 petitions were filed in federal courts oompared to 127 in
1941. See L. RALPH MECHAM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 191 (1991). An entire volume of the U.S. Code
Annotated is now devoted exclusively to reports of federal habeas decisions adjudicating the
constitutional rights of state prisoners. It consists of 1,169 pages, plus a cumulative
supplement ("pocket part") comprising an additional 245 pages. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (1993).
255. See, e.g.; Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963).
256. Fay v. Nosa, 372 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoting from the language of 28
U.S.C. § 2254, which has remained unchanged since 1867.
257. The strict scrutiny standard of judicial review which is presented infra part VII as the
only appropriate standard for habeas review in capital cases would require a showing of a
"compelling governmental interest." This interest can never be established on the basis of
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rights, prison overcrowding, children's rights, and the segregation cases
all bear ample witness to this axiomatic principle.
As a practical matter, those prisoners who actually succeed in
obtaining their freedom by way of federal habeas corpus have been few
and far between. Those fortunate few who prevail in their habeas
petitions are "persons whom society has grievously wronged and for
whom belated liberation is little enough compensation. Surely no fair-
minded person will contend that those who have been deprived of their
liberty without due process of law ought nevertheless to languish in
prison. 258  Unfortunately, there are indeed such "fair-minded
persons" who have contended precisely that. What is most unfortunate
is the fact that they presently occupy a majority of the seats on our
Supreme Court.
VI. The Capital Punishment Nexus
In the view of one commentator, "[t]he Supreme Court has taken
upon itself the task of interpreting habeas corpus out of existence."
' 25 9
In their analysis of recent developments in the "Rehnquist Era Court,"
Messrs. Tabak and Lane point out that the Burger-Rehnquist Court has
enacted "reforms" which have effectively "eliminate[d] the writ of
habeas corpus for many death row inmates," converting it "into an
immensely complex morass of procedural rules and legal
obstacles., 26" That the Court has been actively engaged in judicial
legislating in recent years is no longer open to serious question. This
was candidly acknowledged recently by Chief Justice Rehnquist in a
case in which Chapman harmless error was, in effect, "legislated" out
of existence in collateral appeals.26" ' This was done on the theory
that, "[i]n the absence of any express statutory guidance from Congress,
it remains for this Court to . . . fill the gaps of the habeas corpus
statute .. ,,262
Two important legal consequences flow from this candid statement
by the Court. First, and most important, as with any "legislation,"
economy concerns. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969).
258. Fay, 372 U.S. at 441.
259. Marcia Coyle, Habeas: Results Over Principles? Court Curtails Appeals, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 19, 1990, at 3 (quoting Professor Ira P. Robbins).
260. Tabak & Lane, supra note 236, at 4-5.
261. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. CL 1710 (1993).
262. Id. at 1719 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, Ill S. Ct. 1454 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72 (1977); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963)).
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judicial "legislation" is open to review on grounds of constitutionality,
inasmuch as fundamental constitutional rights (due process, cruel
punishment, and habeas corpus itself) are directly implicated. Second,
as the sole constitutional repository of the power to legislate, Congress
has the authority to restore that which the Supreme Court has seen fit
to take away. The advocate for habeas reform cannot fail to take into
account the respective and different roles of the Court and Congress as
laid down in Articles I and III of the Constitution and to frame
recommendations for change accordingly.
The Court's repeated references to such code words as "finality"
and "deference" '263 thinly disguise its clear result orientation. Unless
defense practitioners are willing to examine root causes and deal with
the hard questions posed by the Supreme Court's recent habeas
jurisprudence, both the viability and accessibility of habeas corpus are
bound to become increasingly more problematic. No disease has ever
been cured without discovery and careful study of its cause and
transmission. The progressive degeneration of habeas corpus is no
exception.
A careful review of the recent habeas case law reveals a splintered
Supreme Court haunted by the growing proliferation and application of
capital punishment statutes. The bulk of the Court's habeas
decisionmaking has come from capital habeas cases. This should come
as no surprise. Ever since the resumption of executions in 1977,264
thirty-five states as well as the federal and United States military
authorities have adopted capital punishment statutes.265 The past
sixteen years have witnessed a growing pattern among the states to
apply the death penalty, and capital punishment has been meted out
randomly at best, and discriminatorily at worst.
266
The tortuous trail of habeas corpus law - from Powell to Sykes to
Teague to McCleskey to Brecht - if at 'all comprehensible, can be
263. Such deference to state court proceedings was not invented by the Burger-Rehnquist
Court. See Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1956).
264. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), brought all executions in this country to a
temporary halt.
265. DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 98, at I.
266. As of July 1993, a total of 210 executions had been carried out (with an additional 37
suicides of death-row prisoners), starting with the execution of Gary Gilmore on January 17,
1977. Of these, 114 (54.28%) of those executed were white, 82 (39.05%) were black, and 13
(6.19%) were Latino. Id. at 4. As of April 20, 1993, there were 2,750 death-row inmates
"known" to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, of whom 1,097 (39.89%) were
black and 194 (7.05%) were Latino or Latina. Id. at 1. In a span of just three months, the
death-row population rose by 21 and the number of executions by 11.
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understood better as effect than cause. The developing malaise of
habeas corpus is directly traceable to the states' increasing resort to the
death penalty as a means of criminal punishment. Modem habeas law
is inextricably interconnected with the law of capital punishment. It is
historically and jurisprudentially significant that Stone v. Powell, the
first major retreat in habeas jurisprudence, was announced in the same
year (1976) in which the Court held that capital punishment was no
longer unacceptably "cruel"2 67  and was not constitutionally
impermissible.2 61 This "constitutionalization" of the death penalty
was accompanied by the imposition of various procedural safeguards to
guarantee that the states' imposition of the death penalty was neither
arbitrary nor capricious. Having erected the procedural safeguards, as
in Lockett v. Ohio,26 9 the Court then proceeded to introduce restrictive
principles such as "full and fair" hearing, "cause and prejudice,"
"procedural default" and non-retroactivity of "new" constitutional
principles, in a thinly disguised effort to stem the tide of capital habeas
270petitions.
The direct link between capital punishment and the "ever-shrinking
authority" of the federal courts to apply habeas corpus so as to enforce
the Court's own procedural safeguards in capital cases was clearly
recognized by Justice Blackmun in Sawyer v. Whitley:27'
Since Gregg v. Georgia, the Court has upheld the constitutionality
of the death penalty where sufficient procedural safeguards exist to
ensure that the State's administration of the penalty is neither
arbitrary nor capricious . . . At the time those decisions issued,
federal courts possessed much broader authority than they do today
to address claims of constitutional error on habeas review and,
therefore, to examine the adequacy of a State's capital scheme and
the fairness and reliability of its decision to impose the death
penalty in a particular case. The more the Court constrains the
federal courts' power to reach the constitutional claims of those
267. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). While Furman technically was a per
curiam decision that only alluded briefly to the cruel-and-unusual punishment clause of the
Eighth Amendment, id. at 239-40, there were nine separate opinions written.
268. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). No single opinion was joined in by a majority of
the Justices. The five cases produced a grand total of twenty-four opinions.
269. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
270. See supra Part Ill.
271. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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sentenced to death, the more the Court undermines the very
legitimacy of capital punishment itself. 72
The movement of the Court away from Furman in 1972 to the
quintet of decisions four years later "constitutionalizing" the death
penalty owed its justification to the Court's willingness to accept state
laws providing for so-called "guided discretion" for the sentencing
authority.273  The theory embraced two facially contradictory
principles: (1) the need to narrow the class of death-eligible persons,
and (2) the need to broaden the scope of the relevant evidence both as
to the crime and the sentencing. The dialectic is completed in the form
of a synthesis whereby these two "opposites" are merged to serve the
socio-juridical objective of making capital punishment palatable and
seemingly rational 74 These changes, more often than not purely
cosmetic, have provided a transparent veneer covering a system which
is, by its very nature, replete with impermissible arbitrariness.275
It is axiomatic that the defense of a capital defendant is an
enormously difficult and demanding responsibility. 276 A capital case
272. Id. at 2530. The Gregg decision, while removing the bar to capital punishment, laid
down the core proposition that the death penalty may not be imposed "under sentencing
procedures that createl] a substantial risk that [the death penalty] would be inflicted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens). The decision in Lockett v. Ohio added the further condition that the sentencing
authority must "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record .and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(opinion of Chief Justice Burger) (emphasis in original).
273. The sentencing scheme had to "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983).
274. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, sees these twin processes
as "ensuring that a capital sentence is the product of individualized and reasoned moral
decisionmaking." Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2534 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
275. It is certainly arguable that the need for effective federal habeas corpus litigation,
preceded by state-court review which, "though adequate in theory, [is] ... not available in
practice," Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961), is as crucial today as it was in the days
of Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). See
supra text accompanying notes 1-14.
276. Counsel must not only be able to deal with the most serious crime -
homicide - in the most difficult circumstances, but must also be
thoroughly knowledgeable about a complex body of constitutional law
and unusual procedures that do not apply in other criminal cases.
Bifurcated capital cases involve two trials with two different sets of
issues. Investigation must often be undertaken in several states and, in
some cases, in foreign countries. And penalty phase preparation requires
extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and
family history.
Report of A.B.A. Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, reprinted in Ira P. Robbins,
Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U.
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invariably is tried in a state trial court. At this crucial proceeding,
defense counsel must function competently and "effectively" to see to
it that the defendant receives a fair and speedy trial. The facts
surrounding the offense must be skillfully and carefully investigated.
This requires preparation and diligence to ensure that the jury is fairly
composed and peremptory challenges are not employed for race-
exclusionary purposes; that full discovery is pursued; that the state does
not conceal exculpatory material, relevant evidence, or witnesses; that
requests to charge the jury are prepared and timely filed; that the actual
jury instructions given by the court are carefully examined for
constitutional or statutory error; and that all post-conviction remedies
are exhausted. Errors of constitutional magnitude often occur in capital
cases,277 and their effect can be fatal not just to the outcome of the
trial, but fatal in fact to the accused.
Conviction is followed by direct and, if habeas corpus is pursued,
collateral appeals. 27 '  The quality of the lawyering at each appellate
stage is often crucial to the outcome. Numerous studies 279  have
marshalled extensive, frequently dramatic, testimony to support the
proposition that competent and experienced counsel are not provided to
the typical indigent defendant charged with a capital crime. What is
most noteworthy about these studies is their near unanimity in the
conclusion that less-than-competent and inexperienced trial counsel in
L. REv. 1, 64 (1990).
277. This proposition is illustrated by the remarkable number of unanimous grants of
habeas relief which have issued even from the Burger-Rehnquist Court. See, e.g., Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (unconstitutionally vague and overbroad statute); Amadeo v.
Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) (jury commissioner's intentional exclusion of blacks and women
from jury); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (exclusion of mitigating factors from
sentencing jury's consideration); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1985) (conviction on
basis of exercise of right to silence); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (conviction on basis
of information derived by state-appointed psychiatrist from unrepresented defendant).
278. Justice Brennan points out that a habeas petition does not implicate appellate
jurisdiction at all. "Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that right is
denied and a person is confined, the federal court has the power to release him. Indeed, it has
no other power; it cannot revise the state court judgment; it can act only on the body of the
petitioner." Fay, 372 U.S. at 430-31 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 173 (1890)).
279. By way of recent examples, see Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon:
Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245 (1991); Tabak
& Lane, supra note 236, at 29-35; Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The
Unconscionability of Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel in Capital Cases, 43
RUTGERS L. REv. 281 (1991). See also Statement of John J. Curtin, Jr. and James S. Liebman,
on behalf of the American Bar Association, before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives
concerning Fairness and Efficiency in Habeas Corpus Administration 29-40 (July 17, 1991)
(manuscript on file with the Dickinson Law Review), citing the findings of the A.B.A. Task
Force appointed in 1989 to study death-penalty habeas reform.
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death-penalty trials and post-conviction proceedings are the rule far
more than the exception. This well-documented phenomenon is a direct
result of the inadequate, often grotesquely insufficient, resources
available for indigent defendants at trial and at all post-conviction
stages.2"'
This phenomenon is the real explanation for the ubiquitous
"squandering of scarce judicial resources""28 which the Supreme
Court has pointed to as one of the reasons for the escalation of its
offensive in recent years against the "abuse" of habeas relief. The
reality is that the expanded resort to habeas corpus by capital
defendants has less to do with "abuse of the writ" than with the serious
weakness of the criminal justice system precisely at the point where it
should be at its maximum "reliability""2 2 - when the government
280. At least six States have a maximum fee of $1,500 or less for appointed
counsel to try a capital case - a fee that many lawyers would find
insufficient to permit adequate representation in routine drunk-driving
cases. Only one or two States provide full compensation .... Typically,
counsel handling State postconviction petitions receive no remuneration.
Poor compensation almost inevitably means that virtually the only lawyers
who are available to handle capital cases are inexperienced and ill-
prepared and that the few more competent lawyers who become involved
cannot develop any expertise because they are financially unable to
handle more than one capital case. Not surprisingly, the inexperienced
and inexpert counsel who handle many of the cases frequently conduct
inadequate factual investigations, are unable to keep abreast of the
complex and constantly changing legal doctrines that apply in capital
litigation, and mistakenly fail to make timely objections to improper
procedures. Indeed, the Task Force heard overwhelming evidence of
incompetent representation in death cases - ignorance of death penalty
law, overlooked objections, failure to present mitigating evidence, failure
to file briefs on appeal, and similar deficiencies.
Curtin & Liebman, supra note 279, at 30 (emphasis in original). As of 1991, Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi had set a statutory upper limit on compensation to capital defense
lawyers of $1,000; Illinois and Kentucky were more generous, setting their fee cap at $1,250;
Georgia, Alabama, and Arkansas provided little or no compensation. Paduano & Smith, supra
note 279, at 349-53 ("Table A"). Several of the States designated above happen to have a
disproportionately large number of death-row populations: Alabama (117); Illinois (153);
Georgia (107); Mississippi (52); Louisiana (47); and Arkansas (33). DEATH Row, U.S.A.,
supra note 98, at 10-25. The funding available for expert witnesses borders on the farcical.
See Tabak & Lane, supra note 236, at 32.
281. See supra part V.C.
282. The Court has recognized the unique nature of capital punishment. In McCoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), it held that the Eighth Amendment requires maximum
reliability of the process by which capital punishment may be imposed. More than just
reliability in the sentencing process, "[i]t also mandates a reliable determination of guilt"
because "death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this
country .... From the point of view of the defendant, it is different both in its severity and
its finality." Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430
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exercises its ultimate authority and deliberately takes the life of one of
its own citizens.
Nor can it be said that the writ is being abused in the face of the
following dramatic statistic presented in July 1991 by John J. Curtin,
Jr., then-president of the American Bar Association: "The high level of
constitutional error implanted in capital trials and appeals by
uncompensated, inexpert, and ill-prepared counsel has required the
federal courts to overturn and order retrials of more than 40 percent of
the post-1976 death sentences that they have reviewed in habeas corpus
proceedings."2"3
These studies undermine all three legs of the Court's tripod which
are cited as justification for the dramatic retrogression of its habeas
jurisprudence. Given the practical and harsh realities of the capital
defense bar, the commands of "federalism" (read deference to state
court decisions) and "finality" become at best irrelevant to the high
purpose of the Great Writ, and at worst cruel hoaxes. The harsh reality
of ineffective representation by frequently inexperienced counsel
combined with the pattern of constitutional error in current habeas
U.S. 349, 357 (1977)).
283. Curtin & Liebman, supra note 279, at 31. In sharp contrast, constitutional violations
were "found in only I to 5 percent of noncapital habeas corpus proceedings" in the A.B.A.
Task Force study. Id. at n.98. To its credit, the Biden Bill, supra note 32, is largely devoted
to the provision of qualified counsel through mandatory specific mechanisms in capital cases.
These include, inter alia, the .following: a "State Counsel Certification Authority" (to establish
"standards governing qualifications of counsel"); statutorily defined "Minimum Counsel
Standards," (including "procedural rules regarding timeliness of filings and procedural default,"
as well as qualifying trial experience generally, capital trial experience in particular, and
appellate experience); specific and relatively high standards to qualify as counsel in capital
post-conviction proceedings; and, most significantly, a requirement that the highest state court
having criminal jurisdiction "shall, after notice and comment, establish a schedule of hourly
rates for the compensation of attorneys appointed pursuant to this section that are reasonable in
light of the qualifications of attorneys appointed and the local practices for legal
representation in cases reflecting the complexity and responsibility of capital cases." Biden
Bill, supra note 32, at 16-28 (emphasis added). Failure of the state court system to make such
provisions would give rise to the granting of injunctive or declaratory relief in the federal
courts. Id. at 14, 28. Funding for the program called for in the Biden Bill contemplates
federal assistance by way of grants through the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Id. at 31-34
("Part R - Grants for State Capital Litigation"). Unfortunately, the bill also contains the
following contradictory and confusing language, which hopefully will be amended and clarified
in Committee:
Nothing in this section changes the constitutional standard governing claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to the sixth amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. A determination of noncompliance with this section (as
opposed to the facts which support such a determination) shall not provide a basis
for a claim of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
Id. at 29.
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litigation (disregarding those cases in which the error was found to be
"harmless 28 4) make expensive and time-consuming pressures on
federal courts inevitable. Were the situation otherwise, there would be
strong reason to suspect that the principles of "fundamental fairness"
and relief for those whom society has "grievously wronged" -
principles of criminal justice to which all of the present and prior
occupants of the Supreme Court (at minimum) give lip-service - have
become hollow and devoid of substance. As for the third leg of the
"tripod" referred to above, namely, the "squandering of scarce federal
resources," the short answer is that saving the lives of factually or
legally innocent prisoners is not a luxury, but a necessity. A
constitutional error rate of forty percent is appalling. Small wonder that
enormous amounts of resources are spent (but surely not "squandered")
in federal habeas litigation in order to examine, review, and, if
necessary, re-review the results of all-too-common poor lawyering."5
Symbolic of the present Court-majority's blindness to the real
world of capital defense litigation is its 1989 decision in Murray v.
Giarratano.2 6  This case epitomizes the Rehnquist majority's
obsession with "cost/benefit" analysis leading invariably to the short-
weighing of fundamental constitutional rights so as to skew the scales
of criminal justice and cheapen the value of human life.
Giarratano287  stands for two propositions, equally insidious and
284. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The constitutional error, which had to be
shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, was recently relaxed for the state on habeas
review in contrast to direct appellate review. Thanks to its 5-4 decision in Brecht v.
Abramson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), the Court has lessened the habeas burden on the
government in the case of errors of the "trial type." The Court substituted the rule in
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), for the less stringent Chapman standard such
that the government need not prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but
merely that the error did not have "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict." Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776.
285. The A.B.A. Task Force calls this "without doubt the single largest cause of delay in
capital litigation." See Curtin & Liebman, supra note 279, at 32.
286. 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
287. Giarratano is the product of a razor-thin 5-4 majority. Justice Kennedy provided a
fifth, albeit somewhat indecisive, vote. He did not share the Chief Justice's "majority" view
that there is no federal constitutional right to counsel in state collateral review proceedings. Id.
at 14-15. Even more interesting is his comment that for death-row prisoners "collateral relief
proceedings are a central part of the review process..." Id. at 14. By reason of the fact that
Giarratano had a volunteer lawyer, Justice Kennedy felt that the right-to-counsel issue need not
have been reached. If one adds to this the fact that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has replaced
Justice White (who voted with the majority in Giarratano, not to mention Sykes, Teague,
McCleskey, and Sawyer), the possibility of overturning Giarratano may not be that remote.
See also the Biden Bill, supra note 32, which, if passed, will serve to remove the worst
features of Giarratano by Congressional legislation.
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highly destructive of the fundamental fairness which lies at the heart of
habeas corpus. The first proposition is that there is no right to counsel
in collateral appellate proceedings.288 This dramatic piece of judicial
legislation in the form of an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist ignores
the realities of present-day habeas litigation and only serves to
exacerbate the ineffective representation syndrome described at length
above. It constitutes a major obstacle to genuine progressive reform of
habeas jurisprudence, which must begin at the source. That source, of
course, is the defense bar which labors in the habeas vineyards. To
declare that they are constitutionally dispensable in collateral
proceedings can only serve to make a bad situation worse.
The A.B.A. "Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus" has
adopted a "Report" which points in the right direction, calling for state-
appointed qualified counsel to be provided to habeas petitioners -
counsel who would be adequately compensated at all stages of capital
proceedings.2"9  Most significantly, the A.B.A. Report proposes
significant, practical incentives and sanctions in the event of failure by
a state to make provision for such "adequately compensated,"
presumably qualified, attorneys and ancillary resources. A state which
fails or refuses to fund such programs would lose the benefit of several
procedural barriers to federal habeas review, such as the exhaustion and
procedural bar doctrines and even the presumption of correctness of
trial court findings of fact.2  Such opportunities for leveling the
habeas playing field are irretrievably lost, or certainly chilled, under
Giarratano.
Giarratano contains yet a second fatal flaw which disserves the
interest of habeas reforms. Giarratano had claimed that he was entitled
to habeas relief because, being a death case, the government should
288. Compare the milestone cases of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (constitutional right to counsel in state appellate
proceedings). In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976), the Court held that state
appellate review was required as a precondition before capital punishment could be imposed.
The Giarratano decision by the Supreme Court overruled a lower court decision, Giarratano v.
Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), which held that the right to counsel was
constitutionally required in habeas proceedings, particularly in the case of death-row prisoners
whose cases are frequently complex. Giarralano is cited with approval in Coleman v.
Thompson, 11 I S. Ct. 2546, 2566-67 (1991) for the proposition that, even in capital cases,
there is no right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings.
289. See Robbins, supra note 276, at 14-15. In addition, the A.B.A. Report recommends
that states be required to provide "sufficient resources for investigation, expert witnesses and
other services, at all stages of capital punishment litigation." Id. at 9.
290. Id. at 10.
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have been held to a higher standard of proof.29' The Court's plurality
opinion rejected that argument, refusing to accept the principle that "the
fact that a death sentence has been imposed requires a different standard
of review on federal habeas corpus." '292 However, imposition of a
death sentence should require a different standard. There can be no
greater "miscarriage of justice" than to execute a person who is actually
or legally innocent.293 The capital punishment cases which permitted
imposition of the death penalty mandated that death-penalty states adopt
procedural safeguards to protect against arbitrary and capricious
imposition of this draconian punishment. 9 4  The fact is, however, that
the death penalty continues to be meted out in ways that are not merely
"arbitrary" or "capricious," but truly "wanton" and "freakish." '2 9' It
is no less true now than at the time Furman was decided that death is
"truly an awesome punishment" and that "[t]he calculated killing of a
291. Id. at 8.
292. Id. at 9.
293. See infra part VIII for a more detailed review of these different forms of innocence,
as well as a third category, "innocent of the death penalty."
294. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
295. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). Consider the
following set of facts: John Eldon Smith and Rebecca Machetti were charged with murder.
Machetti was Smith's "common law" wife. A double-murder took place which was
masterminded by Machetti. Both were tried and convicted by Georgia juries drawn from the
same jury pool, which was unconstitutionally drawn in that women were discriminatorily
underrepresented. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236, 239-41 (11 th Cir. 1982); Smith v.
Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1469 (11 th Cir. 1983). By way of a "procedural default," defense
counsel in both cases failed to file their jury composition objections under Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975), before trial as required under Georgia state law. Machetti's Taylor claim
succeeded before the Court of Appeals (Machetti, 679 F.2d at 241-42); while Smith's identical
claim before the same Court of Appeals foundered on the Sykes procedural bar principles
(Smith, 715 F.2d at 1469-70). Machetti, "the mastermind in this murder ... had her conviction
overturned .. . had a new trial, and ... received a life sentence." Smith, 715 F.2d at 1476
(Hatchett, J., dissenting). Smith was electrocuted on December 15, 1983. More recently, the
Supreme Court itself became a major actor, if not an accomplice, in carrying out the death
penalty against Roger Coleman. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text. Coleman
was executed despite serious credible evidence (never submitted at his trial) that someone else
had committed the murder. The Court also helped to carry out the death penalty against
Robert Sawyer, who claimed that (Brady) constitutional error prevented true mitigating
evidence from reaching the jury on both the issue of "actual innocence" of the crime and
"innocence of the death penalty," Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2521-25 (1972); and
against Warren McCleskey, see supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text, where expediency
of execution seemed to receive greater attention than a flagrant (Massiah) constitutional
violation. Roger Coleman was electrocuted on May 22, 1992. Robert Sawyer was executed by
lethal injection on March 5, 1993. Warren McCleskey was electrocuted on September 24,
1991. See generally, M.L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS
CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992).
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human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the
executed person's humanity. '296  In practically every western
industrial country but our own, the death penalty is an anachronism. 
297
It defies logic, fairness, and humanity for the Court to continue to
"shrug off" capital cases as meriting the same standard of review in
federal habeas corpus as noncapital cases.
VII. Reform Through Review: The Case for Strict Scrutiny
If the reality of the quality of legal representation is the starting
point for substantive habeas reform, the standard for reviewing habeas
decisions by state and federal courts is its procedural counterpart. In
the case of death-row petitioners, that standard must be strict scrutiny.
It is axiomatic that there is no more "fundamental right" than the right
to life. Life is a specifically guaranteed right in the Fourteenth
Amendment of which no person may be deprived without due process
of law. 29' The fundamental quality of this right is linked to and
strengthened by the Great Writ which preceded the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment by hundreds of years, adding the right to life as
part of its "constitutional cargo.,
299
It is too late in the day to argue that capital habeas cases merit any
lesser level of scrutiny. We have now had more than half a century of
experience in which the Court has seen fit to accord special scrutiny to
protect fundamental constitutional rights - indeed even "fundamental
liberties" not tied to specific constitutional guarantees.3°°  Can it
296. Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring).
297. As of July 1992, twenty-eight European countries had abolished the death penalty
either in law or in practice. It was abolished in Great Britain (except for treason) in 1971;
France abolished it in 1981; Canada in 1976. HuGo ADAM BEDAU, THE CASE AGAINST THE
DEATH PENALTY 22 (1992). The United States is joined in its continued widespread resort to
the death penalty by such countries as China, Iraq, Iran, South Africa, and the former Soviet
Union. ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE (1989);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS ... THE DEATH PENALTY: A HUMAN
RIGHTS ISSUE (1989).
298. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
299. Over 350 years of the history of the Writ reflect the fact that "the vessel of habeas
corpus has not changed over that period; only its constitutional cargo has changed, as standards
of decency and due process have evolved and become more enlightened by a humane justice."
I LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.2 at 11 (1988).
300. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). In that case, the Court struck down
Oklahoma's "Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act." What is particularly interesting about the
Court's approach to the compulsory sterilization punishment at issue in that case was its
professed concern for what Justice Douglas describes as "one of the basic civil rights of man,"
the fact that there is "no redemption" for the individual punished by this law, and the fact that
sterilization causes "irreparable injury" in that the defendant is "forever deprived of a basic
liberty." Id. at 541. The Douglas argument applies afortiori to capital punishment, which is
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seriously be argued that a fundamental right specified in the Fourteenth
Amendment and made specifically applicable to the individual States is
entitled to a lesser level of scrutiny than the "penumbra of rights"
creating a right of privacy,3"' the right to integrated marriage,30 2 the
rights to child-rearing and education,30 3 the right to abortion30 4 or
the right to travel?30 5 The fact that federal habeas corpus petitioners
have their lives or liberty at stake places their "fundamental rights" at
the very top of the hierarchy of constitutionally protected liberties. It
is but a short step from that irrefutable proposition to the conclusion
that no standard of review short of strict scrutiny is appropriate in
federal habeas cases.
"Strict scrutiny" refers to a standard for judicial review which
allows a reviewing court to strike down political outcomes as
constitutionally deficient, "either for their looseness of fit between
means and ends, or for the weakness of the interest they purport to
serve. ''3°" Strict scrutiny is constitutionally indispensable to review
those "political outcomes challenged as injurious to those groups in
society which have occupied, as a consequence of widespread, insistent
prejudice against them, the position of perennial losers in the political
struggle."30 7  The classic "perennial losers" in recent American
"political struggles" have been capital defendants.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically recognized the
"fundamental importance" of habeas corpus in our constitutional
scheme308 because it "directly protect[s] our most valued rights."3 9
As the Great Writ, it has become a major bulwark protecting individual
profoundly more "irredeemable" and "irreparable."
301. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
302. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
303. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
304. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
305. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
306. TRiBE, supra note 224, at 1453. "Often, for example, the governmental interest in
efficiency, convenience, or cost-saving may be cited in support of a challenged rule: strict
scrutiny would include judicial wariness of interests such as these which can so easily and
indiscriminately be invoked, and which almost never point uniquely to a challenged political
choice." Id. (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 1453-54. According to Professor Gunther, strict scrutiny is "strict" in theory
and usually "fatal" in fact. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). In the context of capital punishment, strict scrutiny would
presumably remain "strict" in theory and non-fatal in fact.
308. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969).
309. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) (due process case granting to prisoners a
constitutional right of access to the courts).
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freedom. 1 It is totally at odds with any infringement of a death-row
prisoner's right to a habeas review of a claimed constitutional violation
which has infected either his trial or his death sentence. 31 ' Rational
relationship to, or even a "significant interest" in, "federalism" as
generously interpreted by the Rehnquist majority3" 2 cannot be a
legitimate basis for decisions such as Powell, Sykes, Teague,
McCleskey, Coleman,. and their progeny. It cannot be argued, nor did
the Court contend, as would have been required under standard strict-
scrutiny analysis, 3t 3 that the principles laid down in those cases have
been "narrowly tailored" to fulfill a "compelling" governmental interest.
To the contrary, the Sykes line of cases, with their "cause and
prejudice" exception, are tailored for an entirely different purpose. A
careful examination of the leading cases applying the rules in Sykes and
Teague makes their true purpose crystal-clear: to enable federal courts
to deny review of federal cases that they do not consider habeas-worthy.
310. The original view of a habeas corpus attack upon detention under a
judicial order was a limited one. The relevant inquiry was confined to
determining simply whether or not the committing court had been
possessed of jurisdiction. But, over the years, the writ of habeas corpus
evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge from any confinement
contrary to the Constitution or fundamental law, even though imposed
pursuant to conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction. Thus,
whether the petitioner's challenge to his custody is that the statute under
which he stands convicted is unconstitutional; that he has been imprisoned
prior to trial on account of a defective indictment against him; that he is
unlawfully confined in the wrong institution; that he was denied his
constitutional rights at trial; that his guilty plea was invalid; that he is
being unlawfully detained by the executive or the military; or that his
parole was unlawfully revoked, causing him to be reincarcerated in prison
- in each case his grievance is that he is being unlawfully subjected to
physical restraint, and in each case habeas corpus has been accepted as
the specific instrument to obtain release from such confinement.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486-87 (1973).
311. Under Eighth Amendment principles, the Court has required a higher level of
reliability in the process by which capital punishment may be imposed. McCoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (mitigating
evidence cases).
312. See supra part V.B.
313. See GUNTHER, supra note 224, at 491-583 (12th ed. 1991). For an interesting attack
on the Sykes procedural bar doctrine based on equal protection principles, see Laura Gaston
Dooley, Equal Protection and the Procedural Bar Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus, 59
FoRDHAM L. REv. 737 (1991). Professor Dooley argues persuasively that the procedural bar
scheme laid down in Sykes is necessarily geographically discriminatory by reason of the great
variety of state procedural practices and the kind of failure or neglect which triggers a
"default." Absent a "knowing and intentional" waiver, she argues, federal collateral review
should be granted on the merits. Id. at 768-72.
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The strict scrutiny standard of review, aside from being consistent
with constitutional principles governing "fundamental rights," would
serve to end the current confusion, anomalies, and, above all, the ease
with which death-row prisoners are delivered to their executioners.
3I 4
Strict scrutiny would help to clear the air and force the federal courts
to end the current charade of refusing habeas to prisoners who, from a
state procedural standpoint, are "a day late or a dollar short." Further,
this standard would discontinue the present "crusade to erect petty
procedural barriers in the path of any state prisoner seeking review of
his federal constitutional claim." '315 Removal of the Sykes bar would
not mean open season for successive petitions and abuse of collateral
appeals. Rather, it would, within the broad judicial scope of review
which inheres in strict scrutiny, enable the federal courts on a basis
consistent with true "fundamental fairness" to separate capital habeas
"wheat" from "chaff.' ' 316
The A.B.A. Task Force proposals governing successor petitions are
totally consistent with the strict scrutiny standard of review proposed
herein. Its report urges that federal habeas courts should consider any
claimed constitutional violation on its merits where the petitioner's
failure to raise the issue in state court was "due to the ignorance or
neglect of the prisoner or counsel or if the failure to consider such a
claim would result in a miscarriage of justice. ''317 To punish prisoners
for their lawyers' mistakes has nothing in common with what (in
another Constitutional context) is called "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."' Where the
attorneys concede error, whether from ignorance or neglect, the strict
3 14. Capital punishment in this country is clearly on the rise. The rate of executions has
risen from five in 1983 to eleven in 1988 to thirty-one in 1992. In 1993, twenty-two death-
row prisoners were executed by July. DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 98, at 4.
315. Coleman v. Thompson, III S. Ct. 2546, 2569 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
316. Compliance with state procedural requirements, while certainly not to be ignored,
should be de-emphasized in favor of focusing squarely on the substance of the defaulted claim.
If the court's consideration of the defaulted claim presents "a realistic possibility of correcting
an unjust conviction or sentence of death ... procedural barriers should be swept aside and
collateral review should be available." Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 238, at 680.
Unfortunately, while condemning "the increasing proceduralization of habeas law," these
authors' focus is on "factual innocence" with the burden on the petitioner to show "reasonable
probability" of such "innocence" in the broad sense of a "factually erroneous conviction" or
"an unjustified sentence of death." Id. at 691.
317. Robbins, supra note 276, at 10.
318. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). These "evolving standards of decency" can
never be reconciled with a system of "justice" in which death-row prisoners have been
unconstitutionally tried, sentenced, and ultimately executed, because of the "ignorance or
neglect" of defense counsel.
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scrutiny doctrine would require that the court reach the merits of the
claim.3t9 Such currently cherished principles as "procedural bar" and
"cause and prejudice" would occupy a very different place in such a
constitutional scheme.
McCleskey v. Zant320 has, of course, exacerbated the effects of
Sykes by extending its reach.32' Hoisting itself by its own (quite new)
bootstraps, the majority declared that "by failing to raise a claim
through inexcusable neglect ... a petitioner can abuse the writ by
raising a claim in a subsequent petition that he could have raised in his
319. The A.B.A. recommendation to the U.S. House Judiciary Committee addressed this
issue frontally. Where attorneys' mistakes, ignorance, or neglect is established, the courts must
examine the issue on its constitutional merits, reasoning as follows:
The intense concern that some partisans in the death penalty debate have
expressed about this type of provision is misplaced, overdrawn, and based upon
faulty premises. The concern is misplaced to the extent that it proceeds from the
belief that constitutional violations should go unremedied. The concern is
overdrawn because adoption of measures such as those in the ABA
recommendations would render attorney "ignorance and neglect" a rare exception -
not the rule - in capital cases.
Most importantly, the concern is based upon faulty premises to the extent that
it proceeds from the assertion that, unless criminal defendants are punished for their
lawyers' mistakes, those lawyers will intentionally commit procedural defaults in
their clients' "behalf." In making recommendations on habeas corpus, the Task
Force and Association took very seriously their responsibility to consider the factual
bases for this contention. Considerable time during the Task Force's lengthy
hearings was devoted to exploring this factual question with participants on all sides
of the habeas corpus debate. The Task Force found - with no exceptions - that
procedural defaults are not committed by strategically astute (if unethical) lawyers
who intentionally "sandbag" the state courts in service of their clients, but rather by
ill-prepared, inexperienced, and ignorant lawyers who inadvertently do so to the.
great detriment of their clients. Accordingly, to penalize defendants because of
defaults committed by their lawyers all too often adds the insult of "forfeiture" of a
remedy for a constitutional violation to the injury of conviction and capital sentence
at a trial plagued by inadequate representation.
Taking seriously its special responsibility to identify and attempt to cure the
failings of the bar, the Association thus has concluded after careful examination that
the bar's failing lies not with sandbagging but instead with (no less inexcusable)
ignorance and neglect Notwithstanding this finding, the Association's
recommendations on this issue proceed cautiously. Against the possibility that
sandbagging, although undocumented, nonetheless occurs, the Association's
recommendations place a heavy burden of proof upon the prisoner to disprove
sandbagging before securing relief on a defaulted claim. Against the reality of ill-
preparedness and inexperience, the Association proposes the short-term remedy of an
"ignorance and neglect" safety valve for unconstitutionally convicted defendants and
the more significant long-term remedy of procedures capable of assuring informed
and responsible representation in the first place.
Curtin & Liebman, supra note 279, at 45-47.
320. Iil S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
321. The Court held, without the benefit of briefs on the issue by the parties, that abuse of
the writ would be judged by the "cause and prejudice" standards of Sykes. Id. at 1475.
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first . . .," This radical and retrogressive change in the standard of
collateral review in the law of habeas corpus - in the name of
federalism, finality, and limited resources - might just barely escape
rational relationship analysis. It does not, however, even begin to meet
the compelling-state-interest standard required by strict scrutiny.
The corollary to the strict-scrutiny standard, indeed the font from
which it springs, is the bedrock proposition that the constitutional
mandate of habeas corpus as expanded by statute and case law is the
admonition to the court that it must effect the discharge from custody
of prisoners (state and federal) whenever their confinement violates the
Constitution or "fundamental law." Put another way, "the federal
habeas corpus remedy -for capital as well as noncapital prisoners -
should be as broad as the fundamental individual rights that the
Federal Constitution confers.,
323
Assuming, purely arguendo, that an intermediate level of scrutiny
is more appropriate in non-capital cases, the sharp constriction of
habeas relief in the name of such Golden Calves as federalism and
finality cannot withstand constitutional analysis. In order to meet the
constitutional requirements inherent in habeas corpus review as a
"fundamental right" available to anyone claiming unconstitutional
322. Id. at 1468.
323. Curtin & Liebman, supra note 279, at 28 (emphasis in original). It cannot be doubted
that the filing of repeated successor habeas petitions in certain situations, where they are
repetitive and grounded in specious argument, may indeed be abusive and should not be
tolerated. Bearing in mind the fact that there is no statutory, let alone Constitutional, basis for
restricting the number of petitions that a prisoner might bring, some reasonable limitation on
such successor petitions consistent with strict scrutiny analysis is in order. One scholar has
suggested a blend of Fay (deliberate bypass) and Johnston v. Zerbst (waiver) coupled with a
categorization of those constitutional rights which are cognizable on federal collateral review.
Dooley, supra note 313, at 770. Once it has identified these claims, the Supreme Court
"should direct federal courts to review the merits of those claims in all cases, regardless of the
state courts' treatment of the prisoners' procedural behavior." Id. On the other hand, Tabak &
Lane, supra note 236, at 80-81, support the legislative approach recommended by the A.B.A.
Task Force whereby some reasonable limitations on successive petitions would be imposed,
limiting them to claims that "(a) concern grounds that were unavailable previously due to state
action; (b) rely upon a new, retroactive decision not available previously, or upon facts that
were not reasonably discoverable with the exercise of due diligence; (c) undermine confidence
in the guilt of the petitioner; or (d) are so significant that the failure to consider it would
constitute a miscarriage of justice." See Curtin & Liebman, supra note 279, at 48-49.
Practically speaking, this legislative proposal spells out, and makes more juridically palatable,
the successive-petitions limitation. Additionally, it is consistent with the traditional authority of
the federal courts to dismiss a "same-claim" petition where "the ends of justice" do not dictate
otherwise. The A.B.A. language is reminiscent of Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963),
from which the "abuse of the writ" language in 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) was taken, but subject to the
significant qualification "as law and justice require." See 28 U.S.C. § 2243, retaining this
phrase from the original Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, supra note 39.
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incarceration, a court's denial of a hearing on the merits of the alleged
constitutional violations must at minimum satisfy intermediate-standard-
of-review scrutiny324 - i.e., it must serve "important" governmental
objectives and be "substantially related" to the achievement of those
objectives.
The recent dismemberment of the body of habeas corpus law
cannot pass intermediate scrutiny review. Neither finality nor
federalism meet even this lower standard of review requirement for
showing an important governmental interest. As to the former, the
Court itself has laid this issue to rest, having declared: "Conventional
notions of finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at
stake and infringement of constitutional rights is alleged."32  It has
already been demonstrated that the federalism argument is either a
hollow vessel or serves to turn both federalism and habeas upside
down.326 Federalism and comity call for an initial deference to state
courts in criminal trial and appellate procedure. At the core of judicial
federalism is the axiomatic principle that the Constitution and numerous
federal statutes have placed the federal courts at center-stage in the
ongoing process of protecting the people from unconstitutional state
action."' The Constitutional "buck" stops there, even though it does
not start there. No governmental interest - "important" or even
"compelling" - can supersede the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
The federalism-finality-resources rationale for cutting back on
habeas relief is most persuasive in those cases such as Stone v.
Powell,3 2  where the constitutional error clearly has not affected the
truth-finding process at trial. If there is any category of habeas cases
324. See generally TRIBE, supra note 224, at 1601-18. As the Court noted in Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972), the "establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to
achieve legitimate state eads is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."
325. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963). The Court spoke in similar terms in
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963), where it concluded that "conventional notions of
finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that
federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest
opportunity for plenary judicial review." (emphasis added). See also analysis of pretextual
quality of finality as an "important" governmental interest, supra part V.A.
326. See supra part V.B.
327. As "a fundamental safeguard against unlawful custody," habeas corpus requires the
court to address the question which "has always been the same: in the language of the present
statute, on the books since 1867, is the detention complained of 'in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States'?" Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745
(1993) (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
328. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
98 DICKINsoN LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1994
which is suitable for intermediate-level review as a matter of finality,
federalism, and fairness, it is this one.329 But even here, the essentials
of intermediate scrutiny must not be compromised. The "importance"
of the governmental interest served by the demands of federalism and
comity, properly defined, cannot overcome the expansive protection of
our habeas statutes. Because of its exalted place in our constitutional
system and its subsequent embellishment by Congress, the Great Writ
creates a competing and compelling governmental interest of
overwhelming importance: to guarantee a full, fair, and meaningful
habeas hearing and remedy for violation of the federal rights of all
incarcerated persons. The Court itself has declared that "there is no
higher duty than to maintain [habeas corpus] unimpaired."33
By adopting a strict scrutiny level of review in capital cases, there
is a far greater likelihood that prisoners will not be executed, as they are
now,33' despite lower federal court decisions that their convictions or
death sentences are unconstitutional. If an intermediate level of scrutiny
were adopted in non-capital cases, a prisoner who presents a bona-fide
claim of constitutional error at his trial or sentencing would be entitled
to a federal hearing on the merits of a successor habeas petition, subject
to three conditions: (1) that the prisoner has not deliberately withheld
the claim from a previous petition;332 (2) that the prisoner has not
intentionally and knowingly waived the claim; and (3) that the prisoners
is not abusing the privilege of the writ purely for purposes of
harassment, vexation, or delay.333 In the event of a claim by the
prisoner, capital or noncapital, that the omission or default in a prior
petition was the direct result of an attorney's ignorance or neglect, the
burden of proof would rest with the prisoner. If met, the prisoner
would be entitled to a hearing on the merits. With standards of review
thus clarified, there is far greater likelihood of realizing the goal of a
329. Interestingly, Stone v. Powell has not been extended to other cases where the "truth
finding process" was only slightly implicated, if at all. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 113 S.
Ct. 1745 (1993); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 433 U.S.
545, 562-63 (1979) (equal protection claim of racial discrimination in selection of grand-jury
foreman).
330. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
331. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993); McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct.
1454 (1991); Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
332. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1993); see also "deliberate bypass" rule in Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963).
333. See Hon. Louis E. Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D.
313 (1948).
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functioning, nondiscriminatory habeas jurisprudence, particularly for the
prisoner who is facing execution.334
VIII. Actual Innocence: "Escape Hatch" or "Death Trap"?
Notwithstanding its undisguised determination to remove as many
obstacles as possible to the efficient and expeditious termination of
capital punishment litigation, the Rehnquist majority has had difficulty
in circumventing the bedrock barrier of actual innocence. Even in those
cases involving procedurally defaulted, "abusive," or successive-claim
petitioners, or those who can demonstrate neither "cause" nor
"prejudice," the Court has felt obliged to create an escape hatch for the
innocent prisoner. Whether in the name of "fundamental miscarriage
of justice '335 or under the more general "ends of justice"336 rubric,
the Court has been increasingly stubbing its collective toe on the
petitioner who protests his innocence.
The traditional understanding of the phrase "fundamental
miscarriage of justice" was that such a miscarriage occurs whenever a
conviction or sentence is the end-result of a violation of a federal
constitutional right. The 1986 trio of habeas decisions (Wilson, Carrier,
and Smith)337  "shifted the focus of federal habeas review of
procedurally defaulted, successive, or abusive claims away from the
preservation of constitutional rights to a fact-based inquiry into the
petitioner's innocence or guilt.' 3 8 This complete shift in emphasis
away from measuring the effect of constitutional violations upon the
334. "The Association believes that, in the interest of the [sic] maintaining basic liberties,
as well as in the interest of dispatch and public comprehensibility, capitally sentenced prisoners
should be entitled to have some federal court address the merits of every nonfrivolous
constitutional claim they present." Curtin & Liebman, supra note 279, at 33-34.
335. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 495-96 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1986).
336. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 455 (1986) (plurality opinion). Factual innocence
first begins to emerge as an exception to the Sykes (cause and prejudice) exception in this case
under the "ends of justice" exception, to the effect that a federal court should entertain same-
claim successor petitions only when the petitioner "supplements his constitutional claim with a
colorable showing of factual innocence." Id. at 454. Thus, a plurality of the Court reversed a
Sanders dictum to the effect that the "ends of justice" exception was not intended to be limited
to claims of factual innocence. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1963).
337. For greater detail, see supra text accompanying notes 88-98. These cases were
foreshadowed by United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783 (1979) ("complete miscarriage
of justice").
338. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2526 (1992). Kuhlmann v. Wilson refers to "a
colorable showing of factual innocence," 477 U.S. at 454; Carrier speaks of "one who is
actually innocent," 477 U.S. at 496; and Smith, 477 U.S. at 539, addresses "the accuracy of the
guilt or sentencing determination."
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trial or sentencing and toward assessment of actual innocence received
the formal imprimatur of the Rehnquist Court in Sawyer v. Whitley.339
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist framed the issue as
follows: "The issue before the Court is the standard for determining
whether a petitioner bringing a successive, abusive, or defaulted federal
habeas claim has shown he is 'actually innocent' of the death penalty
to which he has been sentenced so that the court may reach the merits
of the claim."34  In the course of the opinion (in which Justices
White, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter and Thomas joined), the terms
"miscarriage of justice" and "actual innocence" are treated as though
synonymous.34" ' On the other hand, "actual innocence" and
"innocence of death" are not.
342
Sawyer carried the 1986 cases to their furthest extreme, without
benefit of any statutory authority and totally ignoring the equitable
nature of habeas corpus proceedings. Later, in Herrera v. Collins, the
Court declared that the claim of "actual innocence" is "not itself a
constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim
considered on the merits. 343  The court went on to state that the
339. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). Robert Sawyer was convicted of murder and exhausted all of
his Louisiana state appeals. The reported appeal to the Supreme Court was based on a second
federal habeas petition containing, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's words, "successive and abusive
claims." Id. at 2517.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 2518-19.
342. Id. at 2519. "Demonstrating that an error is by its nature the kind of error that might
have affected the accuracy of a death sentence is far from demonstrating that an individual
defendant probably is 'actually innocent' of the sentence he or she received." Dugger v.
Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 412 n.6 (1989).
343. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 862 (1993). This excerpt from the Chief Justice's
opinion is true theater of the absurd. A claim of actual innocence is "not itself a constitutional
claim," says Rehnquist, totally ignoring the strictures of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Can he be serious in his contention that an "actually innocent prisoner" must
show some other constitutional violation to obtain release? "Actual innocence" gets the
prisoner through the door; but the way out of the prison is by way of consideration of an
"otherwise barred constitutional claim" on the merits. The majority opinion elsewhere declares
that "a truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the
execution of a defendant unconstitutional ... " Id. at 869. Unfortunately, the Biden Bill buys
into this innocence trap in the section entitled "Limits on Successive Petitions." This provision
would amend 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) so as to mandate dismissal of successive habeas petitions
unless the facts underlying the application, if proven and viewed in light of all the evidence,
would be sufficient to:
(i) undermine the court's confidence in the factfinder's determination of the
applicant's guilt of the offense or offenses for which the sentence was imposed; or
(ii) demonstrate that no reasonable sentencing authority would have found an
aggravating circumstance or other condition of eligibility for a capital or noncapital
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"threshold showing for such an assumed right would be extraordinarily
high."3" There is an almost brazen quality to the Court's grafting of
this legislation upon settled principles of statutory habeas law. Over
one hundred years ago, the Court declared: "As the writ of habeas
corpus does not perform the office of a writ of error or an appeal, [the
guilt of the petitioner] cannot be re-examined or reviewed in [a]
collateral proceeding. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes could not
have said it more plainly: "[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas
review] is not the petitioners' innocence or guilt but solely the question
whether their constitutional rights have been preserved."34
The present Court's inordinate emphasis on the question of "actual
innocence" is incompatible with the letter and spirit of the
Congressional grant of habeas jurisdiction. The statutes clearly direct
the federal courts to accept petitions from state prisoners who are held
"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws .... There
is no basis for an exception to an exception in the form of "actual
innocence," which is a cruel-and-unusual punishment and due-process
claim, not a habeas claim. In the words of Justice Blackmun:
The accusatorial system of justice adopted by the Founders affords
a defendant certain process-based protections that do not have
accuracy or truth-finding as their primary goal. These protections
- including the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination, the Eighth Amendment right against the imposition
of an arbitrary and capricious sentence, the Fourteenth Amendment
right to be tried by an impartial judge, and the Fourteenth
Amendment right not to be indicted by a grand jury or tried by a
petit jury from which members of the defendant's race have been
systematically excluded - are debased, and indeed, rendered
largely irrelevant, in a system that values the accuracy of the guilt
determination above individual rights.348
sentence, or otherwise would have imposed a sentence of death.
Biden Bill, supra note 32, at 10.
344. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 869. This prompts the obvious question: How high is
"extraordinarily high"? According to Justice O'Connor, the federal courts' "attention, efforts
and energy" should be reserved for the "truly extraordinary case." Id. at 874 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In Justice Blackmun's view, shorn of its rhetoric, the Court's professed concern
about "actual innocence" is more pretext than principle, meaning "that habeas relief should be
denied whenever possible." Id. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
345. In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 305 (1888). "[l~t is well settled that upon habeas corpus
the court will not weigh the evidence." Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 84 (1905).
346. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86. 87-88 (1923) (emphasis added).
347. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1993).
348. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2528 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Guilt or innocence is irrelevant in habeas jurisprudence. As
currently applied (one is tempted to use the word "abused") in habeas
cases by the Court, it is much more a trap than an escape hatch.
3 49
Instead of adhering to its traditional judicial function on habeas review,
adjudicating process-based claims of constitutional violations so as to
guarantee that the ends of justice are served, the Court is seemingly
obsessed with guilt or innocence. The metamorphosis of habeas
jurisprudence into its current status as a legal obstacle course is no
accident. Rather, it is a product of the Court's transparent
determination to engage in a "self-fashioned abdication""35 of its duty
to protect federal rights.
"Actual innocence" as the escape hatch fits the present mold
perfectly. Application of this principle in Sawyer and Herrera exposed
it as a hoax. It is a game that the death-row petitioner can almost never
win. If, as in Herrera, the petitioner has a more-than-credible claim to
factual innocence, he is reminded by the court that "[flew rulings would
be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for federal
habeas review of free-standing claims of actual innocence." 35' Since
actual innocence is not a "constitutional claim," unless petitioner has
Sykes-type procedural error undergirding an independent constitutional
claim (the "gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass"), the
"'mere" contention that newly discovered evidence probably proves that
petitioner's conviction is factually incorrect does not suffice.
Given this constitutional jousting with the lives of death-row
prisoners, the logic of Justice Blackmun's dissenting view becomes
irrefutable:
In other words, having held that a prisoner who is incarcerated in
violation of the Constitution must show he is actually innocent to
obtain relief, the majority would now hold that a prisoner who is
actually innocent must show a constitutional violation to obtain
relief. The only principle that would appear to reconcile these two
349. For a contrary view, see Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 238, at 686-91, applauding the
Sykes progeny's "escape hatches" such as "actual innocence." They would urge a much lower
burden of proof, however, such as proof of a "reasonable possibility" of a factually erroneous
conviction or sentencing. Id. at 691. Cf. Sawyer, 112 S. CL at 2517, containing the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard such that "no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner
eligible for the death penalty .... "
350. Coleman v. Thompson, II1 S. Ct. 2546, 2571 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
351. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861. After all, quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887
(1983): "Federal Courts are not forums in which to litigate state trials."
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positions is the principle that habeas relief should be denied
whenever possible.3s2
Even on the level of "innocence of death," the present Court
majority's clear purpose is unmistakable. Recognizing the fact that the
death penalty is qualitatively different from any other penalty, the Court
declared: "It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and
appear to be, the consequence of scrupulously fair procedures. 353
Yet, in Sawyer, the Court managed to undermine the reliability and
even legitimacy of the death penalty by simply removing one of the two
bedrock principles undergirding capital-punishment jurisprudence. As
a result, Sawyer stands for the anomalous proposition that the
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception applies only to the
prisoner's eligibility, not ineligibility, for the death penalty.354
With its decisions in Sawyer and Herrera, the Court has placed
capital petitioners in a "lose-lose" situation. If they submit credible
evidence of innocence, they are reminded that federal courts are not
there to relitigate state trials, that guilt-innocence determinations on
federal habeas review are disruptive, that actual innocence is only a
"gateway" for consideration of some underlying constitutional violation,
and that such a claim of innocence is not itself a constitutional claim.
If their claimed escape from the Sykes procedural bar is not grounded
on actual innocence at all, but is limited to innocence of death, they are
reminded of the overriding importance of actual innocence (a total
irrelevancy) and the fact that mitigating-factor evidence, which is
directly on point on the issue of the death penalty, will not be
considered on habeas review, but only eligibility for death.
352. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 880-81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
recognizes that the standard for relief on the merits of an actual-innocence claim must be
higher than that for "the threshold standard for merely reaching that claim or any other claim
that has been procedurally defaulted or is successive or abusive," and the petitioner "must show
that he probably is innocent." Id. at 882. Once this threshold standard is met, the standard of
review triggered thereby should be that of strict scrutiny, as argued in part VII, supra.
353. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545-46 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
354. The habeas court must focus on aggravating factors only "and not on additional
mitigating evidence which was prevented from being introduced as a result of a claimed
constitutional error." Sawyer, 112 S. CL at 2523. As Justice Stevens points out, "the Court's
impoverished vision of capital sentencing is at odds with both the doctrine and the theory
developed in our many decisions concerning capital punishment." Id. at 2534 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). So much for the cherished principle of "fundamental fairness" which is "the
central concern of the writ of habeas corpus." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697
(1984).
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The innocence escape-hatch is clearly insidious. It is subject to
arbitrariness and manipulation. It is a trap. No one will "escape" and
miscarriages of justice will continue. The equitable principles
underlying habeas corpus have no place in the "innocence doctrine" laid
out in Sawyer. Having introduced the concept of "miscarriage of
justice," the Court must redefine it so as to inject it with fair and
equitable substance. Failing that, Congress should take the issue in
hand by formally restoring the "miscarriage of justice" principle
contained in the prior statute.355 The present scheme, which is replete
with potential for condoning the execution of someone who is actually
innocent,356 is totally at odds with the letter and statutory purpose of
habeas corpus.
IX. Conclusion
While its exact origins are uncertain, habeas corpus dates back at
least to the Magna Carta.35" Historically, it has constituted the major
barrier between government and the wrongful detention of any person.
It has included within its parameters a penumbra of constitutional rights
and liberties which are essential to prisoners claiming to be unlawfully
detained and are of life-and-death importance to capital defendants.
The foregoing review of recent habeas jurisprudence demonstrates
a pattern of ad hoc, case-by-case, result-oriented decisions. Whether the
terminology is Justice White's "confused patchwork,"358  Justice
Kennedy's "much confusion," '359 or Justice Marshall's "Byzantine
morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the
vindication of federal rights,"'36 the results have been increasingly
fatal - both in the human sense and in the constitutional sense.
355. "Miscarriage of justice" was traditionally understood as having no particular
limitation, a phrase that should not be "too finely particularized." Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1963). The "miscarriage ofjustice" phraseology was dropped from the
statute in 1966. However, even though the statute no longer makes specific reference to this
clearly paramount objective of habeas review, the Court has declared continued adherence to
the principle that the federal courts must consider the "ends of justice" before dismissing a
successive petition. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 451 (1986).
356. It is important to recall Justice Blackmun's admonition in Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 884
(Blackmun, J., dissenting): "The execution of a person who can show that he is innocent
comes perilously close to murder."
357. See supra note 35. See also WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
HABEAS CORPUS 17 (1980).
358. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1728 (White, J., dissenting).
359. McCleskey, 111 S. CL at 1461.
360. Coleman, I I I S. Ct. at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court's decisions since Stone v. Powell have turned
back the clock. The Court's newly-rediscovered zeal for finality,
coupled with its perceived need to defer to state court decisions in the
name of "federalism," has served the Rehnquist majority's transparently
pragmatic objective: expedition and acceleration of capital punishment.
The quintessential preconditions for a system of capital punishment that
is "constitutional" - "scrupulously fair procedures,
3 61
"reliability," 362 "individualized moral judgments, ' 363 and the like -
have lost their positions of primacy in the prevailing capital punishment
jurisprudence. The inflation of finality, federalism, and cost/benefit
analysis has debased the currency of the core constitutional principles
which are at the heart of both capital punishment and habeas corpus
jurisprudence.
The sheer uniqueness of death as a form of punishment makes it
different from all other forms of criminal punishments, "not in degree
but in kind." 3" In its finality, the death penalty "is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. 3 6  From
this qualitative difference has emerged the principle of the indispensable
need for "reliability" in every case of capital punishment. The corollary
to reliability of the verdict and judgment in such cases is the concept of
individualization3 66 in the sentencing process.
The combination of the prerequisites of reliability and
individualization cannot co-exist with the Court's recent approach to the
filing of successive habeas petitions.3 6 Blanket rules governing such
petitions - including, but not limited to, preclusion of habeas relief in
the face of procedural defaults and evidentiary errors by less than
competent counsel - have little or nothing in common with the history
and constitutional purpose of habeas corpus. Reliability and
individualization require a heightened standard of judicial review to
provide a habeas remedy for trial and appellate errors of constitutional
magnitude during both guilt and sentencing proceedings. That standard
361. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 546 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
362. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 n.13 (1980).
363. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1976).
364. Furman v. Georiga, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
365. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
366. A capital sentencing statute must provide for the individualized "consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense."
Id. at 304; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S.
66, 74-76 (1987). Death penalty jurisprudence "mandates an individualized assessment of the
appropriateness of the death penalty." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 317 (1989).
367. It is conceded that the writ may indeed be "abused" in certain cases, such as the
deliberate withholding of a claim.
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is strict scrutiny review, one which requires the state to justify its
position and meet its burden by demonstrating that it is employing
narrowly-tailored, necessary means to achieve a compelling government
interest.
It was the Court's resort to a kind of balancing test that spawned
the cause-and-prejudice requirement promulgated in Wainwright v.
Sykes and its progeny. It simply weighed the competing interests of the
habeas petitioner and the state and concluded that the petitioner's
procedurally-defaulted claim could not be entertained absent proof of
cause and prejudice. As a practical matter, such "balancing" by the
Court has been essentially a standard of rationality review, a standard
which facilitates and serves to promote deference to the state.
According to this highly permissive form of review, the presumption is
made in favor of the government's sentencing authority, and the habeas
petitioner must show that his punishment is irrational.
The destructive consequences of the balancing test in Sykes were
clearly demonstrated nine years later in Kuhlmann v. Wilson. In that
case, Justice Powell declared that the prisoner's interests would
outweigh those of the state only "where the prisoner supplements his
constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence."368
The balancing test of Kuhlmann has quickly become embedded in
recent habeas corpus law. The emphasis on "factual innocence" is
easily traceable to the Court's milestone decision in Stone v. Powell,
wherein the majority held that resort to habeas corpus should be limited
primarily to protect the innocent. 369 The line from Stone to Sykes to
Kuhlmann to Smith to Dugger to McCleskey, and culminating in
Sawyer, is a straight one. With balancing reduced to a rational
relationship test as its standard of review, deference prevails,
expediency wins, and cost/benefit analysis is the norm.370
The Court's adoption of this standard of review has thus led
directly to its current emphasis upon "innocence." In turn, this has led
the Rehnquist majority inexorably to the erroneous assumption that the
sole purpose of federal habeas review is to ensure the reliability of the
determination of guilt. 37 ' But, as pointed out by Justice Stevens,
368. 477 U.S. at 454. See also McCleskey v. Zant, I 1l S. Ct. 1454, 1470 (1991); Murray
v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
369. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
370. "Expediency may tip the scales when arguments are nicely balanced." Woolford
Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 330 (1932).
371. The "Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1993," or Biden Bill, supra note 32, falls into
lock-step with the current Rehnquist majority in its proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. 2244(b).
The precondition for entertaining a claim which was not timely filed in a prior petition is that
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"[o]ur criminal justice system, and our Constitution, protect other values
in addition to the reliability of the guilt or innocence determination, and
the statutory duty to serve law and justice should similarly reflect those
values.""3 2
Essential to the Court's return to its historical role as final arbiter
of habeas review, which is to examine all claims of constitutional error,
is recognition of the insidious nature of the balancing test in habeas
jurisprudence. This balancing must be replaced with a standard of
review which is consistent with the fundamental constitutional rights
which are at issue - namely, the right to life and liberty. Any lesser
standard than strict scrutiny in capital cases serves to undermine the
historical purpose of the Great Writ as well as the constitutional
legitimacy of capital punishment. Heightened reliability requires
heightened scrutiny by the federal courts. If the Great Writ is to be
restored to its position as a centerpiece of our liberties, the doors to the
federal courthouse must remain open to those claiming its protection.
As the Supreme Court declared in a different context:
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human
rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for
adjudication, and that we have not the right to decline the exercise
of that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be
adjudicated in some other forum.373
The most fundamental of human rights under the Federal
Constitution are the rights to life and liberty. Such precious rights can
only be protected under a system of judicial review which applies strict-
scrutiny in capital habeas cases and, at minimum, intermediate scrutiny
in non-capital habeas cases. Nothing short of a maximum degree of
reliability is acceptable so long as capital punishment continues to
prevail in almost three-quarters of our jurisdiction and its toll of human
lives continues to mount."'
The balancing test is a creature of the Burger-Rehnquist majority,
by way of the Stone-Sykes-Kuhlmann-Teague-McCleskey line of
decisions. It is a test which fewer and fewer habeas petitioners are able
to pass. It has served to convert the Great Writ from a major avenue
for the redress of constitutional violations to a narrow, treacherous
roadway full of holes and tortuous turns. In the course of the Senate
there must be evidence that would undermine the court's confidence either in the finding of
factual guilt or the death-sentencing process. See supra note 343.
372. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
373. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
374. See generally DEATH Row, U.S.A., supra note 98.
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Judiciary Committee hearings on her nomination, Judge (now Justice)
Ruth Bader Ginsburg quoted the following eloquent passage from the
writings of Justice Cardozo: "Justice is not to be taken by storm. She
is to be wooed by slow advances." '375 If the Great Writ is to be
restored to its central place in our constitutional system, it is long past
time for some "slow advances" in the direction of serving the ends of
justice.
375. SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo, THE CHOICE OF TYCHO
BRAHE 245 (Margaret E. Hall ed., 1947).
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APPENDIX A
The following is an excerpt from the "Habeas Corpus Reform Act
of 1993," S. 1441, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993), also referred to in
this Article as the "Biden Bill":
Sec. 2. Filing Deadlines.
(a) In General.-Section 2242 of Title 28, United States
Code, is amended-
(1) by amending the heading to read as follows:
"§ 2242. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time requirements;
tolling rules"; ...
(3) by amending the third paragraph, as designated by
paragraph (3), to read as follows:
"(3) Leave to amend or supplement the petition shall be freely
given, as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil
actions."; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
"(b) An application for habeas corpus relief under section
2254 shall be filed in the appropriate district court not later than
180 days after -
"(1) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari
in the United States Supreme Court on direct appeal or unitary
review of the conviction and sentence, if such a petition has
not been filed within the time limits established by law;
"(2) the date of the denial of a writ of certiorari, if a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the highest court of the State
on direct appeal or unitary review of the conviction and
sentence is filed, within the time limits established by law, in
the United States Supreme Court; or
"(3) the date of issuance of the mandate of the United
States Supreme Court, if on a petition for a writ of certiorari
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the Supreme Court grants the writ and disposes of the case in
a manner that leaves the sentence undisturbed.
"(c)(1) Notwithstanding the filing deadline imposed by
subsection (b), if a petitioner under a sentence of death has filed
a petition for post-conviction review in State court within 270 days
of the appointment of counsel as required by section 2258, the
petitioner shall have 180 days to file a petition under this chapter
upon completion of the State court review.
"(2) The time requirements established by subsection (b) shall
not apply unless the State has provided notice to a petitioner under
sentence of death of the time requirements established by this
section. Such notice shall be provided upon the final disposition
of the initial petition for State post-conviction review.
"(3) In a case in which a sentence of death has been imposed,
the time requirements established by subsection (b) shall be
tolled -
"(A) during any period in which the State has failed to
appoint counsel for State post-conviction review as required
in section 2258;
"(B) during any period in which the petitioner is
incompetent; and
"(C) during an additional period, not to exceed 60 days,
if the petitioner makes a showing of good cause.
"(d)(1) Notwithstanding the filing deadline imposed by
subsection (b), if a petitioner under a sentence other than death has
filed
"(A) a petition for post-conviction review in State court;
or
"(B) a request for counsel for post-conviction review,
before the expiration of the period described in subsection (b),
the petitioner shall have 180 days to file a petition under this
chapter upon completion of the State court review.
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"(2) The time requirements established by subsection (b) shall
not apply in a case in which a sentence other than death has been
imposed unless -
"(A) the State has provided notice to the petitioner of the
time requirements established by this section and of the
availability of counsel as described in subparagraph (B); such
notice shall be provided orally at the time of sentencing and
in writing at the time the petitioner's conviction becomes
final, except that in a case in which the petitioner's conviction
becomes final within 30 days of sentencing, the State may
provide both the oral and the written notice at sentencing; in
all cases, the written notice to petitioner shall include easily
understood instructions for filing a request for counsel for
State post-conviction review; and
"(B)(i) the State provides counsel to the petitioner upon
the filing of a request for counsel for State post-conviction
review; or
"(ii) the State provides counsel to the petitioner, if a
request for counsel for State post-conviction review is not
filed, upon the filing of a petition for post-conviction review.
"(3) The time requirements established by subsection (b) shall
be tolled in a case in which a sentence other than death has been
imposed -
"(A) during any period in which the petitioner is
incompetent; and
"(B) during an additional period, not to exceed 60 days,
if the petitioner makes a showing of good cause.
"(e) An application that is not filed within the time
requirements established by subsection (b) shall be governed by
section 2244(b)."

